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UNION DECERTIFICATION UNDER THE NLRA
JANICE R. BELLACE*
The labor law of the United States is premised on the belief that
employees have a right to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing' and that an employer must recognize this right
when a majority of his employees designates a union as its bargaining
agent. 2 That employees should also have the right to refrain from bar-
gaining collectively if they so desire can be viewed as a logical corollary
of this premise. In 1947, Congress, accepting this line of reasoning,
amended the Wagner Act 3 to provide a means whereby employees may
decertify their union as bargaining agent.4
In the years immediately following the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act, 5 rival unionism between affiliates of the American Federa-
tion of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations led fre-
quently to the raiding of each other's locals, thus focusing attention on
the decertification procedures of the National Labor Relations Act.6
Since the merger of the AFL with the CIO in 1955, the incidence of
. B.A., J.D., University of Pennsylvania; M.Sc. in Industrial Relations, London School of
Economics. Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Senior Faculty Research Associate-Indus-
trial Research Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. The research for this arti-
cle was supported in part by unrestricted grants to the Industrial Research Unit from the Pew
Memorial Trust.
I. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in sec-
tion 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). [The National Labor Relations Act is hereinafter referred to as the NLRA
or the Wagner Act.]
2. The principle that the will of the majority controls is set out in § 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
3. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)). The Wag-
ner Act was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976)). Section 9(c) was amended to provide for decertification as well as for
certification of bargaining agents.
4. Such a statutory provision is one which may well be unique. In Western Europe, for
instance, no country provides a statutory mechanism whereby employees can oust their union.
Few countries, however, have statutory procedures akin to union certification.
5. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976)).
6. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended by Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
(Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, as amended by Act of July 26,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
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raiding has declined greatly 7 and, with it, the interest in decertification.
The recent sharp increase in the number of decertification petitions
filed with the National Labor Relations Board8 has generated renewed
interest in the subject of union decertification. In order to discuss the
balance between employees' free choice and industrial stability that the
rules and regulations governing decertification have achieved, this ar-
ticle first outlines the development of these rules through decisions of
the NLRB and the courts.
TYPES OF DECERTIFICATION
The label "decertification" is correctly used to describe two very
different situations. In the first, an incumbent union loses its status as
exclusive bargaining agent and is not replaced by another union. In the
second, the employees' allegiance is transferred from one union to an-
other, either immediately or within the year. Unfortunately, the litera-
ture on the subject of decertification frequently fails to acknowledge
this crucial distinction. This failure may be attributed in part to the
record-keeping method of the NLRB, which does not indicate whether
a rival union was involved in a decertification effort, thereby making
research on this point difficult.
For the most part, the process of decertification falls within the
first category described above. Decertification petitions are usually
filed by employees pursuant to section 9(c)(1)(A)(ii) 9 of the Act and, if
successful, usually lead to a "no union" situation. In some instances
where there is an incumbent union, an employer will file a petition for
an election under section 9(c)(l)(B)'° of the Act on the grounds that he
has a good faith doubt about the union's continuing majority status.
Although uncommon, it is possible for an initial certification election to
result in the loss of bargaining rights for an incumbent union that had
previously been voluntarily recognized by the employer.
Rival unionism undoubtedly does account for some proportion of
decertification activity, although it is extremely difficult to glean any
information on this from the statistics. A rival union acting on behalf
of the unit employees may directly file a decertification petition. With
7. See note 13 infra and accompanying text. The decline is attributable in great part to the
no-raiding pact among AFL-CIO affiliates. Non-AFL-CIO affiliates, such as the UAW and the
Mineworkers, tend to avoid raiding other unions' members. Some Teamsters' locals continue to
engage in raiding as part of their general organizing effort.
8. Hereinafter referred to as the NLRB or the Board.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(I)(A)(ii) (1976). See text accompanying note 20 infra.
10. Id. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1976). See text accompanying note 21 infra.
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the requisite showing of interest, a rival union can secure a position on
the ballot. In some instances, rival unions more or less explicitly insti-
gate an employee decertification petition but do not make any attempt
to appear on the ballot, preferring to wait out the twelve-month period
prescribed by section 9(c)(3) ti before seeking a representation election.
This strategy is usually followed by AFL-CIO unions not wishing to
violate openly the federation's no-raiding pact. 12 In order to clarify
which union he should recognize for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing, an employer may also file an election petition if two or more un-
ions are competing to represent his employees.
Finally, it is possible for a union to lose its bargaining rights with-
out any party approaching the National Labor Relations Board to file a
petition or unfair labor practice charges. This occurs when an incum-
bent union voluntarily relinquishes its role as bargaining agent upon
realizing that it no longer commands majority support within the unit.
Without pertinent data, it is not possible to speculate on the frequency
of such occurrences, but labor practitioners mention that it is not un-
known. 13
THE NLRB's DECERTIFICATION CASELOAD
In examining the NLRB's statistics on decertification cases since
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,14 the most striking figure
that emerges is the nearly threefold increase in the number of employee
decertification petitions since 1967. In addition, the period since 1975
has marked a sharp decline in the fortunes of unions. Unions now win
11. Section 9(c)(3) of the Act provides:
No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which
in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held. Employees
engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible to
vote under such regulations as the Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and
provisions of this subchapter in any election conducted within twelve months after the
commencement of the strike. In any election where none of the choices on the ballot
receives a majority, a runoff shall be conducted, the ballot providing for a selection be-
tween the two choices receiving the largest and second largest number of valid votes cast
in the election.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976).
12. In December 1953, officers of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations signed a "no-raiding" agreement which pledged their respective affiliates
to refrain from organizing another union's members. The protection against raiding has been seen
as the chief benefit of affiliation to the AFL-CIO. See A. SLOANE & F. WHITNEY, LABOR RELA-
TIONS 144-46 (3d ed. 1977).
13. See, e.g., R. Prosten, Special Analysis of 1970 NLRB Election Victories (June 23, 1976)
(internal AFL-CIO memorandum from Research Director to the Executive Board of the federa-
tion's Industrial Union Department).
14. These figures were obtained from the NLRB Annual Reports for the years 1948 through
1979. 13-14 NLRB ANN. REP. (1948-1979).
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less than 30% of decertification elections; a record low was reached in
1977 when unions won only 22.8% of decertification elections.
The number of "RD" cases, the Board's designation for employee
decertification petitions, hovered in the 330-490 range during the dec-
ade 1948-1958. During the next decade, there was a slow, slight move-
ment upward. Since 1967, however, the decertification caseload has
nearly tripled, from 624 petitions in 1967 to 1,793 petitions in 1979.
The number of decertification elections conducted has followed a simi-
lar pattern; likewise, the number of eligible voters has almost tripled
since 1967.
The average size of units in which decertification elections are
held, however, has been declining gradually since 1962. The decline
may explain to some extent why the union success rate has also de-
clined, since it is generally believed that unions are more likely to win a
decertification election in larger bargaining units.' 5 In 1979, for in-
stance, unions won elections in units averaging ninety employees and
lost in units averaging thirty-eight employees.' 6 Although the number
of decertification elections had been increasing, the success rate of un-
ions showed no consistent fall prior to 1975. In that year, unions won
under 30% of decertification elections, and this lower success rate (in
the mid-20% range) now seems to be the pattern.
The data also reveal that fewer decertification cases are now being
withdrawn or dismissed. Prior to 1953, only about 30% of decertifica-
tion cases reached an election. This figure hovered in the 35-40% range
until 1974. Here, too, a major change has occurred since 1975. Signifi-
cantly fewer cases are being withdrawn or dismissed, with a record
high of 47.9% of cases reaching an election in 1977.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
When the Wagner Act 17 was enacted in 1935, section 9 set out the
procedure enabling employees in an appropriate bargaining unit to se-
lect a union as their exclusive bargaining representative.18 The Wagner
Act, however, contained no provision whereby employees dissatisfied
15. Between 1951-1962, the average size of units was fairly stable, not falling below 65. The
average has declined since 1962, with the average unit size in 1979 being 51 employees. Charles J.
McDonald, Assistant to the Director, Organizing and Field Services Dep't, AFL-CIO, estimates
that unions win 40% of all decertification elections in units having more than 100 employees, but
only 20% of those elections involving units of less than 100 employees. See Cook, Divorce Union
Style, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 25, 1979, at 38 [hereinafter referred to as Cook].
16. 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1979).
17. See note 3 supra.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
UNION DECERTIFICATION
with their union could rescind their choice. Nor did the Act provide a
means whereby an employer could initiate the NLRA's election pro-
cess. In 1947, as part of the revision of national labor policy embodied
in the Taft-Hartley Act, 19 section 9(c)(1)(A) was inserted to provide
that an election petition could be filed:
by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor
organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number
of employees. . .(ii) assert that the individual or labor organization,
which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their em-
ployer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative
as defined in subsection [9](a). 20
Section 9(c)(1)(B) of the Taft-Hartley Act gives an employer the right
to file a representation election petition "alleging that one or more indi-
viduals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be rec-
ognized as the representative defined in subsection [9](a)." 2'
In debating the amendments to section 9 of the Wagner Act,22
Congress focused its attention in large measure on the desirability of
curbing industrial conflict arising from the rampant rival unionism of
the era. In the Senate, proponents of the amendment bill repeatedly
referred to the plight of the employer who, having recognized and bar-
gained with a union, found himself helpless when a union from the
rival federation picketed his plant and neither union would file for an
election. 23 In response to this predicament, opponents of the bill un-
successfully supported an amendment that would have given employ-
ers the right to request certification but would have left decertification
solely within the discretion of the NLRB. 24
When the proposed statutory decertification process was ad-
dressed, its proponents emphasized that it was necessary to ensure em-
ployee freedom of choice, an argument to which labor's backers had
difficulty in responding directly. Not until near the end of the Senate
debate did one senator point out what impact section 9(c) could have in
conjunction with section 9 as it then read. Senator Pepper presented
the hypothetical situation of a bargaining unit in which no election had
occurred during the previous year and where workers who were en-
gaged in an economic strike had been replaced.25 He noted that, since
19. See note 4"supra.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1976).
21. Id § 159(c)(1)(B).
22. For the Senate debates, see II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 (1948) [hereinafter referred to as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY II].
23. See, e.g., id. at 965, 983, 990, 1066, 1077, 1496, 1523.
24. Id at 1452-53.
25. Id at 1606 (statement of Senator Pepper).
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only the replacements would vote, it was nearly certain that the union
would be decertified. 26 He concluded that, if an employer wanted to
break a union, he had the power to do so. Curiously, most other oppo-
nents of the bill predicted rather unlikely effects for section 9(c). For
example, it was feared that employers would repeatedly file for a decer-
tification election at the expiration of every collective agreement or that
unions would be tempted to make unreasonable bargaining demands
as a means of retaining their members' allegiance in the face of an em-
ployer decertification attempt. 27
RAISING A VALID QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION
In order to secure a decertification election, a petitioner must sat-
isfy the Board that a number of requirements have been met, some of
which are dictated by the Act and others of which have resulted from
the Board's policy and procedures. Essentially, the petitioner must
demonstrate that a "question of representation" 28 exists at the time the
election is directed. To make such a determination, the Regional Di-
rector checks that:
1. the petitioner can establish the requisite showing of interest;
2. the petition emanates from an appropriate source;
3. the petition relates to a unit that is appropriate for collective
bargaining;
4. there is currently a union that claims bargaining rights;
5. the petition is "timely"; and
6. there are no pending unfair labor practice charges which
serve to "block" the petition.
If the petition meets these conditions, the Regional Director will
direct an election; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. The Re-
gional Director's decision can be appealed to the five-member Board in
Washington.29 This paper examines the requirements that must be sat-
isfied to secure a decertification election and then considers the likeli-
26. Between 1935-1947, the right of replaced economic strikers to vote was in dispute. Sec-
tion 9(c)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act denied economic strikers the right to vote in representation
elections. In 1959, § 9(c)(3) was amended so that economic strikers who are not eligible for rein-
statement are entitled to vote in an NLRB election for 12 months following the commencement of
the strike. See note II supra.
27. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY II, supra note 22, at 1042 (statement of Senator Murray).
28. Section 9(c) of the Act provides that the Board shall direct an election upon finding that a
question of representation exists. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
29. In 1959, § 3(b) of the Act was amended, enabling the five-member NLRB to delegate to
its Regional Directors its powers under § 9 to process and decide representation cases. The Board
delegated this authority in 1961. The five-member Board may, at its discretion, accept representa-
tion cases for review. If the Board refuses to review, the Regional Director's decision becomes
final.
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hood of an election's being held, given the Board's policy on
presumption of majority.30
The Showing of Interest
In decertification cases, the party filing for an election must show
within forty-eight hours of filing the petition that 30% of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit desire an election. The Board has
consistently held that determining the adequacy of the showing of in-
terest is an administrative matter within the Board's discretion that is
not subject to subsequent challenge. The Board supports its position by
noting that any election held will effectively protect the interests of the
parties.31
Employee decertification petitions are checked to determine if 30%
of the unit employees have signed the petition. Representation election
petitions filed by rival unions may be validated in the same way, or the
rival union may present signed authorization cards.
Before 1966, employer petitions were allowed solely on the
grounds that the employer had shown that he was faced with a claim
for recognition. When an employer petitioned for a decertification
election, the employer merely had to show that the union was currently
recognized, either voluntarily or as a result of certification, for the unit
concerned, that the union had expressed its intention of remaining the
bargaining agent and that the employer had rejected or otherwise ques-
tioned the union's continued majority status. Believing that the legisla-
tive history of the Taft-Hartley Act did not support any qualification of
the employer's right under section 9(c)(1)(B) to question the majority
status of an incumbent union, the Board did not question the good
faith of the employer's doubt of the union's majority status.
In 1966, in United States Gypsum Co. ,32 the Board modified its
policy on employer petitions after concluding that not only did the stat-
ute not prohibit the Board from exercising its discretion to dismiss em-
ployer petitions where there was no good faith doubt, but that its
exercise of such discretion actually accorded with the legislative intent.
30. For a thorough discussion of the NLRB's policies, see R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS .& K.
HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (1974). For an article dealing specifically
with conduct during decertification campaigns, see Krupman & Rasin, Decertiocation." Removing
the Shroud, 30 LAB. L.J. 231 (1979). See also Krislov, Deceriocation Elections Increase but Re-
main No Major Burden to Unions, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 1979, at 30; Anderson, Busman &
O'Reilly, What Factors Influence the Outcome of Decerftication Elections, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Nov. 1979, at 32.
31. 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 33 (1950).
32. 157 N.L.R.B. 652 (1966).
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In United States Gypsum, the Board announced that it would require
employers not only to show that the union claimed recognition and that
this had been questioned, but also to "demonstrate by objective consid-
erations that it has some reasonable grounds for believing that the
union has lost its majority status." 33 Supporting this change in policy,
the Board stated that the requirement of objective evidence would en-
hance bargaining stability. Unless there was some basis in reality for
the employer's doubt of its majority status, a union would no longer
have to fight an election campaign at a time when it should be prepar-
ing for negotiations on a new collective agreement. 34
The Appropriate Source
Under section 9(c)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act, decertification petitions
may be filed by employees or by agents acting on behalf of the employ-
ees. Thus, the Board has found petitions filed by lawyers and labor
relations consultants acceptable. 35 A union's objection to the filing of a
petition by a lawyer or consultant who has previously done work for
the employer will be dismissed unless it is determined that the peti-
tioner has, in reality, been acting as an agent for the employer in the
decertification campaign.3 6
The Board has taken the view that an employer cannot instigate or
encourage decertification, since such activity would be incompatible
with the performance of his continuing statutory obligation to recog-
nize and bargain with the union as the representative of his employees.
It should be noted that this restraint on the employer's freedom of
speech ceases to operate once it is decided that there exists a valid ques-
tion of representation regarding the unit.
Consonant with this view, the Board will not entertain any decer-
tification petition filed by managerial or supervisory personnel, since it
does not regard such a petition as raising a valid question of represen-
tation.3 7 As with cases dealing with inclusion or exclusion of alleged
supervisors in the bargaining unit, this policy has required the Board to
33. Id at 656.
34. The question of what constitutes a good faith doubt of majority status often arises in the
wider context of a charge under § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of
his employees. For a discussion of good faith doubt of majority status, see text accompanying
notes 202-18 infra.
35. Alexander Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1056 (1958).
36. See, e.g., Armco Drainage & Metal Prods., Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1956).
37. See Clyde J. Merris, 77 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1948).
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make a number of judgments about the nature of a supervisor's work.
The Board's starting point is section 2(11) of the Act, which states:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pro-
mote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or re-
sponsible to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exer-
cise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment. 38
The extent of similarity between the alleged supervisor's duties and the
work of other unit members is a major factor in the determination. 39 In
view of the very great diversity of work situations, coupled with the
changing duties a person may assume in a small, informal company, it
is not surprising that the members of the Board often disagree on a
person's status.40
Even if the person who filed the petition is found not to be a super-
visor, the petition may still be dismissed if the Board believes it has
been tainted by the employees' perception that the person was a super-
visor or that the person was acting at the behest of the employer. For
instance, in Columbia Building Materials, Inc. ,41 the son of a plant su-
pervisor prepared and circulated the decertification petition. The son's
work tasks, while varied, were clearly superior to those of the other unit
employees in the job hierarchy. In addition, the son was the only unit
employee not on the timeclock. The Board found that the circulation
of the petition was attributable to the employer, even assuming that the
son was not a supervisor, since a number of employees reasonably be-
lieved that the son was in charge when his father was absent from the
plant premises. 42
Similarly, in Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics,43 the person who
circulated the decertification petition was one of only two bilingual em-
ployees in a unit where many employees, but none of the supervisors,
spoke Spanish. Her bilingualism and the fact that she had substantially
more seniority than any other employee combined to place her in a
powerful intermediary position between management and the other
unit employees. Although she was clearly at a level below the other
38. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
39. See, e.g., Doak Aircraft Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 924 (1954).
40. A typical case is Custom Bronze & Aluminum Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 397 (1972), where
Chairman Miller dissented from his colleagues' finding that the petitioner was a supervisor on the
grounds that he was really only a leadman. Id at 398-99.
41. 239 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1979).
42. Id at 1346-47.
43. 235 N.L.R.B. 363 (1978), mod&6ed, 628 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
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members of the supervisory staff, the Board found that she was a super-
visor within the meaning of the Act since she assigned and checked
work and effectively had the power to hire and to impose minor disci-
pline. In finding her decertification petition tainted, the Board relied
not only on her supervisory status but also on her conduct. As the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge stated:
She was the dominant figure, leading employees to believe that she
was reflecting management's desires in soliciting their signatures,
promising better things if the Union were ousted, and threatening
loss of jobs if it were not. Even if higher supervision and manage-
ment had been totally unaware of Martinez' activities and represen-
tations, the effect on employees would have been the same as if it had
encouraged and approved her conduct. 44
Supervisory status becomes an issue in a decertification case when
it is asserted that the alleged supervisor was instrumental in preparing
the decertification petition and in soliciting support for the decertifica-
tion. If the alleged supervisor takes a direct role in the preparation of
the petition itself, the petition will usually be dismissed on the grounds
that it emanated from an improper source. If the incumbent union sus-
pects supervisory participation in the decertification campaign, it may
file a charge under section 8(a)(1).45 If the Regional Director issues a
complaint, the decertification petition will nearly always be dismissed
under the Board's blocking charge policy.
Prior to 1958, Board policy dictated that, before finding that a
decertification petition raised a valid question of representation, the
Regional Director should consider whether the petition had been insti-
gated by the employer. In Georgia Kraft Co. ,46 the Board altered this
policy by stating that allegations of supervisory participation in the
decertification effort should not, in the future, be entertained in the rep-
resentation proceedings and should be investigated only administra-
tively by the Board.47  The Board has clearly distinguished the
principle of excluding the issue of supervisory participation from hear-
ings on the petition from its continuing refusal to accept decertification
petitions filed by supervisors.4 8
Not all interference by a supervisor during a decertification cam-
44. Id. at 376.
45. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
46. 120 N.L.R.B. 806 (1958).
47. Id at 808. Such evidence is now presented by the parties to the Regional Director.
48. Modem Hard Chrome Serv. Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1959).
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paign is unlawful. The Board has long distinguished between employer
instigation of a decertification petition and assistance rendered after the
employees have decided to act. Since employees dissatisfied with their
union but uninformed of their statutory options will often enter into a
discussion with their supervisor regarding what can be done about the
union, the line between employer instigation and assistance can be ex-
tremely fine. In general, the Board seeks to determine who initiated the
conversation and whether the employee's questions to the supervisor
indicated that decertification was already in the employee's mind.49
Although a supervisor may outline the decertification procedure in re-
sponse to an employee's question, the more active a role the supervisor
takes in assisting the employee-generated decertification, the more
likely it is that the employer will be found to have violated section
8(a)(1).
If a supervisor merely adds "individual and isolated encourage-
ment to an independently originated decertification drive,"50 his con-
duct may violate section 8(a)(1) but not taint the decertification
petition. In GAF Corp. ,5 a supervisor suggested to an employee dissat-
isfied with the union that an in-plant committee be formed to oust the
union, a suggestion that was never acted upon. One month later, the
same employee initiated a conversation critical of the union with the
same supervisor. At this time, the supervisor suggested that the em-
ployee telephone the regional office of the NLRB to obtain information
concerning the filing of a decertification petition. The Board found the
in-plant committee suggestion unlawful but held that it was not suffi-
ciently closely connected with the petition conversation so as to render
the later conversation violative of section 8(a)( 1).52 Hence, the em-
ployer was found not to have instigated or unlawfully assisted the
decertification campaign.
When it is clear that a supervisor has discussed decertification with
unit employees, thus violating section 8(a)(1), and an employee decer-
tification petition is later filed, the question becomes whether the super-
visor's comments amount to employer inducement of the
decertification petition. Since first-line supervisors are in constant,
close and informal contact with unit employees, their seemingly insig-
49. Compare Bond Stores, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1929 (1956) with Southeast Ohio Egg Produ-
cers, 116 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1956).
50. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363, 376 (1978), modified, 628 F.2d I
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
51. 195 N.L.R.B. 169 (1972).
52. Id at 169.
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nificant comments may be interpreted as having great import and influ-
ence. Not surprisingly, as National Cash Register Co. 53 illustrates, the
Board and the courts do not always agree on whether a supervisor's
comments have had a coercive impact.
In National Cash Register, the union won elections in the winter of
1970 in Duluth, Detroit and New York City to represent a unit of tech-
nical services representatives. In May 1970, the union signed a one-
year contract, backdated to January 1. In July, the union filed a charge
under section 8(a)(1) alleging that a supervisor in New York City had
outlined the procedure for decertification and had stated that certain
pay increases would be retroactive if decertification occurred. The su-
pervisor's comments were made to some unit employees during routine
performance appraisal interviews. It was alleged that in all three cities,
supervisors were noting during performance appraisal interviews that
the employees would normally have been entitled to wage increases
under the company's merit plan but that this was not permitted under
the union contract. With the contract due to expire at the end of 1970,
decertification petitions were timely filed in late October.5 4
In November, the Regional Director decided against issuing a
complaint on the union's charge. The union appealed, and the Re-
gional Director's decision was reversed. The decertification petitions
were then dismissed under the Board's blocking charge rule, and the
case proceeded to a hearing on the unfair labor practice complaint. In
June 1972, the Administrative Law Judge recommended finding that
the General Counsel had failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the employer had induced the filing of the employee
decertification petitions in all three cities. In February 1973, the Board
unanimously rejected this recommendation.
Emphasizing that the supervisors' conversations with employees
during performance appraisals constituted a pattern of direct dealing
with employees over terms and conditions of employment in deroga-
tion of the union's status as bargaining agent, the Board concluded that
the company's "conduct, although widely scattered geographically...
was pursuant to a carefully orchestrated plan to sow dissatisfaction
among the employees with union representation for the purpose of in-
53. 201 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1973), enforcement denied in material part, 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir.
1974).
54. Petitions were filed in New York City and Detroit in late October. The Duluth unit did
not file a petition until early 1971.
55. See text accompanying notes 227-55 mfra.
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citing the filing of decertification petitions." 56 The Board pointed out
that the General Counsel had conceded that there was no direct evi-
dence of company involvement in the filing of the decertification peti-
tions but had argued that it could be reasonably inferred that there was
such involvement. Agreeing that such an inference could be reason-
ably drawn, the Board noted that the filing of the petition "resulted in
large measure if not entirely," from the company's unlawful conduct.57
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed that the supervisors' com-
ments regarding the employees' entitlements under the merit plan vio-
lated section 8(a)(1), but the court did so "reluctantly" since there was
much disputed testimony and the Board's finding of coercive impact
was "highly speculative." 58 The Eighth Circuit, however, refused to
accept the Board's finding that the decertification petition was the in-
tended effect and direct product of the employer's misconduct, and
held that the Board's inferences were impermissible.59 Impressed by
the fact that the employee filing the petition in New York City had not
been present during any conversation in which a supervisor made un-
lawful comments, the court took the Adminstrative Law Judge's posi-
tion that there was no substantial evidence linking the employer to the
filing of the petition.60
The Appropriate Unit
The question of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit
arises in all representation election cases. After the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the Board decided to apply the same general principles it
had developed in certification cases to decertification cases. Ordinarily,
the unit appropriate for decertification is "the unit previously certified
or the one recognized in the existing contract unit. ' 61 The main unit
issues that the Board has had to resolve relate to the attempts of em-
ployees to secure decertification elections in distinct sections of mul-
tiplant or multiemployer bargaining structures.
In the years immediately following the passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act, the Board permitted severance by specific subgroups within certi-
fied units. Craft and professional employees were the main benefi-
56. 201 N.L.R.B. at 1034.
57. Id
58. National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 189, 192-93 (8th Cir. 1971).
59. Id at 193.
60. Id
61. W. T. Grant Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 670 (1969).
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ciaries of this policy. 62 In 1955, however, the Board reversed its stance
and held that decertification elections should no longer be used to
achieve severance. 63
In general, the Board has refused to direct decertification elections
for subgroups where there has been a demonstrable history of multiunit
or multiemployer bargaining. 64 The mere fact that the unit in question
had previously been certified separately does not per se justify separate
decertification where those employees have participated in a joint ne-
gotiating structure. The Board's view on this point with regard to mul-
tiemployer bargaining is open to serious criticism. Where a number of
employers bargain as a group with one union and the employees of one
employer no longer want that union as their bargaining agent, the em-
ployees' objective of ridding themselves of the union could be achieved
easily if their employer would take appropriate action to withdraw
from the multiemployer bargaining group. The Board's view, however,
allows the employer to lock the employees into a situation not to their
liking. Hence, it would seem that this view denies the employees the
right to select representatives of their own choosing as guaranteed by
the Act.
Each case is examined on its own merits. For instance, the techni-
cality that the employers sign separate collective agreements will not
outweigh a factual analysis that points to multiemployer bargaining. 65
In cases involving multiemployer bargaining, the Board has viewed a
significant history of multiemployer bargaining as an important factor
arguing for a finding that a multiemployer unit exists. But it is not the
controlling factor. Rather, the Board seeks to determine "whether the
parties have demonstrated an unequivocal intention to be bound by
group action." 66 Not unexpectedly, unit determinations under this test
are less predictable than under a history-of-bargaining test.
Similar problems arise when decertification for a subgroup of em-
ployees subject to a multiplant agreement is sought. The Board's posi-
tion on subunit decertification has not been entirely consistent. For
instance, in 1961, the Board held that despite a history of wider bar-
gaining, elections would be appropriate in separately certified
62. See, e.g., Kelsey Hayes Wheel Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 666 (1949); Gabriel Steel Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 1361 (1948).
63. Campbell Soup Co., II1 N.L.R.B. 234 (1955).
64. See General Motors Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1958) and cases cited therein.
65. See, e.g., Win. T. Kirley Lumber Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 130 (1971).
66. Taylor Motors, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 711 (1979).
656
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subunits.67 Where joint bargaining had only existed for a short while
and there was evidence that the employees had accepted its introduc-
tion only under pressure from the union, decertification petitions would
be accepted by the Board.68 After Duke Power Co. ,69 some observers
believed that the Board was once again taking a more favorable view
towards subunit decertification. In Duke Power, the short length of
time in which multiplant bargaining had been applied to the subunits
was considered by the Board, which directed decertification elections in
three units that had all been certified less than five years and had been
added to a systemwide bargaining unit.70 Yet, in Westinghouse Electric
Corp. ,71 the Board found that a unit which had been certified only
fourteen months had been effectively merged into a nationwide bar-
gaining agreement that permitted local agreements to supplement the
national master agreement. In Westinghouse, the Board declared that
the local union had failed to retain "a sufficiently separate, independent
bargaining position from the other locals . . . in matters of collective
bargaining. ' 72
The current status of the Board's policy is difficult to evaluate. It
can be said with some certainty that the Board will refuse to accept
decertification petitions from units that are included in a multiplant
bargaining arrangement that has a long and stable history. But where
the history of multiplant bargaining is shorter and where supplemental
local agreements are of considerable importance, the Board's determi-
nation cannot be predicted with any certainty.
Timeliness
A decertification petition does not raise a question of representa-
tion unless it is timely, both in relation to the one-year election bar
under the Act and to the contract bar created by the Board. Under
section 9(c)(3) of the Act, no election can be held in a unit within
67. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 889 (1961); Mission Appliance Corp., 129
N.L.R.B. 1417 (1961).
68. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 928 (1973).
69. 191 N.L.R.B. 308 (1971).
70. Id at 311. Member Brown sharply criticized the Board's decision as a departure from
previous practice. Id. at 312-13. See Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 947, 950 (1954),
where the Board specifically held that inclusion in a multiplant unit for a period of one year was
sufficient to merge the certified unit into the larger bargaining unit.
71. 227 N.L.R.B. 1932 (1977). At issue here was the IUE's coordinated bargaining approach
toward Westinghouse through the IUE-Westinghouse Conference Board. See also General Elec.
Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1970), which dealt with the attempted decertification of a unit included in
the IUE-GE Conference Board.
72. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1933.
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twelve months of a valid representation election. The twelve-month
period runs from the date the election was held. If a union wins a
representation election, however, the twelve-month period runs from
the date of the certification, absent unusual circumstances. The Board
established this one-year certification bar on the basis that the union is
entitled to a full twelve months as bargaining agent and that its status
as bargaining agent is not definite until certification. In a case where
the employer voluntarily recognized a union and concluded a one-year
contract with it prior to a certification election, the Board held that the
certification identifies the bargaining agent "with certainty and finality"
for one year.73 In Brooks v. NLRB, 74 the United States Supreme Court
accepted the Board's view that the one-year period should run from the
date of certification rather than from the date of election as within the
allowable area of the Board's discretion in carrying out the purposes of
the Act. 75 A much more frequently encountered barrier to the filing of
a decertification petition is an existing collective bargaining agreement,
which may bar the petition under longstanding Board policy.
Contract Bar
In attempting to effectuate the sometimes conflicting statutory
objectives of fostering stability in labor relations while according em-
ployees freedom to select representatives of their own choosing, the
Board has resorted to a policy whereby the employees' ability to vote in
a Board election is postponed for a certain period of time because a
valid collective agreement is in effect. This doctrine, called contract
bar, is premised on the belief that:
[c]ontracts established the foundation upon which stable labor rela-
tions usually are built. As they tend to eliminate strife which leads to
interruptions of commerce, they are conducive to industrial peace
and stability. Therefore, when such a contract has been executed by
an employer and a labor organization. . . the postponement of the
right to select a representative is warranted for a reasonable period of
time.76
The Board's contract bar doctrine dates from 1939, when it was applied
to postpone a representation election. 77 After the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the doctrine was extended to decertification cases.78 The
73. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 90, 92 (1945).
74. 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
75. Id at 104.
76. Paragon Prods. Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662, 663 (1961).
77. National Sugar Ref. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1939).
78. Snow & Neally Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 390 (1948).
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precise application of the doctrine has been modified several times,
with a thorough reconsideration of the rules in a series of cases in
1958.79 The establishment of the contract bar doctrine and various
rules implementing it has usually been deemed to be within the discre-
tion of the Board as an exercise of its administrative expertise.80
The contract bar rules are complex and embrace several issues.
The major issues include (1) the duration of the contract, (2) the ade-
quacy of the agreement, (3) changed circumstances during the life of
the contract, (4) the status of the contracting union, and (5) the exist-
ence of unlawful contract provisions.
Duration of the Contract
The contract bar doctrine restrains the employees' right to select
their representatives at certain times, a restraint that is not mentioned
in the statute. Because of this, the Board has several times considered
whether the length of the contract bar was proving an unwarranted
restraint of the employees' section 7 rights. In Pacfc Coast Association
of Pup & Paper Manufacturers,8' the Board recognized that not only
must employees be afforded an opportunity to select their representa-
tives at reasonable intervals, but such intervals should occur at easily
predictable times.82 As a result, the Board announced in Pac!fic Coast
that a contract would serve as a bar to the filing of a petition for the life
of the contract or two years,8 3 whichever came first. The Board further
reasoned that, since the main justification for the contract bar doctrine
was the promotion of industrial peace, no contract should operate as a
bar unless it represented a commitment to stability in industrial rela-
tions. Hence, contracts having no fixed duration, such as contracts
lacking termination or duration provisions or contracts terminable at
will, do not serve as a bar to the filing of a petition.84
The Board construes its rules strictly, and, at times, with unneces-
79. Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880 (1958); Hershey Chocolate
Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958); Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990
(1958); Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958); Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., 121
N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958); General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958).
80. See, e.g., Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Efco Mfg., Inc., 203 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1953) (per curiam).
81. 121 N.L.R.B. 990 (1958).
82. In Pacfic Coast, the Board abandoned its "substantial part of the industry" test which
required it to determine in which industry the employer belonged and what was the normal
length of contracts in that industry. In many cases, the answer to one or both questions was far
from predictable. Id at 992.
83. In General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962), the Board adopted its current three-
year rule. Id at 1125.
84. 121 N.L.R.B. at 993-94.
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sary inflexibility. For instance, in Cind-R-Lite Co. ,85 a three-year con-
tract expired on April 1, 1978. On April 4, the employer submitted a
final proposal to the union that included no termination date but did
call for three annual wage increases to take effect on April 1, 1978, 1979
and 1980. The union accepted the offer on April 5. The following day,
a decertification petition was filed. The Regional Director dismissed
the petition as untimely on the basis of the contract bar doctrine. The
Board, however, adhered strictly to its rule that the contract must con-
tain an expiration date that is apparent from the face of the contract. 86
Since, on its face, the contract's final annual wage increase could be
construed to continue indefinitely, the Board held that the contract con-
tained no express expiration date and, therefore, it was no bar to a
decertification election. 87
The precision of these rules is of great help to those employees
seeking to file a decertification petition, since the NLRB will consider a
petition timely only if it is filed not more than ninety nor less than sixty
days before the expiration of the contract for a contract not exceeding
three years in length, or at any time after three years for a longer con-
tract.88  The filing period has been longer in the past 89 and it can be
argued that it is too short at present, but the length of the filing period
is an issue only when its reasonableness is questioned. Thirty days is a
reasonable filing period if employees have adequate advance notice of
the period so that they can mount a campaign and collect sufficient
signatures on a decertification petition in due time. Since many em-
ployees are likely to have only a thirty-day period once every three
years in which to file for decertification, it is of utmost importance that
the filing period should be easily calculated in advance, and the
Board's present rules ensure that this can be done.
A more serious objection to the present rules concerning the filing
period relates more to its placement than its duration. The Board has
set sixty days prior to the expiration of a contract not exceeding three
years in length as the termination of the filing period, since unions are
required by section 8(d)(1) 90 of the Act to serve notice in writing to the
85. 239 N.L.R.B. 1255 (1979).
86. Id at 1256.
87. Id
88. Leonard Wholesale Meats Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962).
89. Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958), set the filing period at not more
than 150 nor less than 60 days before the expiration of the contract.
90. Section 8(d)(l) provides:
[W]here there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an in-
dustry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party
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employer at least sixty days before the expiration of the contract of
their intent to modify the contract. 91 If the union's status as bargaining
agent is in doubt, this should be known before the employer sits down
to bargain with that union. Under the Board's present rules, however,
it is not unusual for a union to mail notice of its intent to modify the
contract at about the same time a decertification petition is being
filed.92 The employer may well receive the union's letter with its re-
quest that a date for negotiations be set before he receives notice from
the Regional Director that employees have filed for decertification.
The employer may be aware of the decertification campaign and may
be uncertain whether to begin bargaining or to delay responding to the
union's request. Likewise, the union may have concentrated its ener-
gies on the imminent negotiations only to discover suddenly that bar-
gaining will be delayed pending the outcome of the decertification
effort. Clearly, it would foster stable labor relations if the possibility of
such uncertainty were removed from the onset of negotiations. Such a
goal could be achieved merely by moving back the filing period fifteen
days, which would enable the regional office of the NLRB to process
the petition prior to the commencement of the bargaining period.
Adequacy of the Agreement
In keeping with its view that postponing the employees' right to
select their representative is warranted by the stability a collective
agreement promotes, the Board held in Appalachian Shale Products
Co. 93 that a contract would not serve as a bar to a decertification elec-
tion unless it contained "substantial terms and conditions of employ-
ment deemed sufficient to stabilize the bargaining relationship."94 The
Board, therefore, seeks to determine whether the agreement being put
forward as a contract barring decertification contains terms sufficiently
to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such
termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed ter-
mination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event
such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to
make such termination or modification ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (1976).
91. The filing period is 120-90 days prior to contract expiration for health care employees
since 90 days notice of intent to modify is required in health care units by § 8(d)(4)(A). 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(4)(A) (1976).
92. See, e.g., Telautograph Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 892, 893 (1972).
93. 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958).
94. Id at 1163. The term specifically mentioned by the Board in Appalachian Shale was
wages.
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important and definite so as to minimize the likelihood of industrial
conflict during the life of the contract.
The contract must be in writing95 and signed by the parties. 96 This
does not, however, require that a formal document be signed for the
contract to serve as a bar.97 In Valley Doctors Hospital, Inc. ,98 the em-
ployer mailed a complete contract proposal to the union with a cover
letter that clearly indicated that a contract would result if the union
accepted the offer without modification. The employees voted to ac-
cept the contract on May 7, at which time the union telephoned the
employer with this information. The following day, a decertification
petition was filed. On May 14, the union mailed the employer a copy
of the contract signed by the union officers and dated May 7. The
Board held that the exchange of a written proposal and a written ac-
ceptance satisfied the contract bar rule of Appalachian Shale. A similar
case, Diversified Services, Inc. ,99 highlighted the common practice of
attorneys acting for the parties at the bargaining table. There, the
union's attorney sent a telegram to the employer's attorney, stating that
the union accepted the employer's last offer and requesting that the
attorney forward a contract for signature. The employer's attorney
then sent two unexecuted copies of a contract based on the parties'
written agreements during bargaining and on the employer's position
on unresolved issues. The contract was accompanied by a cover letter
signed by the employer's attorney, requesting that the two copies be
signed and returned. The union promptly did so. Shortly thereafter, a
decertification petition was filed. The Regional Director found that the
contract did not serve as a bar on the grounds that the attorney's signa-
ture on the cover letter did not constitute the employer's signature on
the contract and that the employer had not given the attorney power to
bind the employer without approval of the employer's executive board.
The Board disagreed. Emphasizing that the attorney conducted all the
negotiations for the employer and that throughout the negotiations he
had represented to the union that he had the authority to bind the em-
ployer on matters arising at the bargaining table, the Board found that
the attorney's signature on the cover letter and the union's signature on
the contract were sufficient to satisfy the rule in Appalachian Shale.100
95. Id at 1161.
96. Id. at 1162.
97. Id
98. 222 N.L.R.B. 907 (1976).
99. 225 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1976).
100. Id at 1092.
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Once the contract's expiration date has passed, the parties are
often committed to reaching an agreement as quickly as possible so
that a strike may be averted or terminated. As a result, the employer's
last offer may be communicated to the union's membership before it is
fully set down in writing. Members dissatisfied with the union's per-
formance at the bargaining table may, at this point, seek to file a decer-
tification petition if it seems likely that the membership will accept the
employer's offer. Whether or not a decertification petition will be ac-
cepted in such situations depends on whether the petition is filed before
the agreement is set down in writing to some extent. Liberty House 10'
illustrates the uncertainty of the application of Appalachian Shale in
such circumstances.
In Liberty House, the employer operated two department stores in
different shopping centers. The union represented salesclerks at both
stores in one unit and office employees at both stores in another unit.
In June 1975, the contracts expired. In November, a new contract cov-
ering the salesclerks was concluded. On December 4, the employer
wrote to the union concerning the office employees' contract. Referring
to a telephone conversation in the interim about a new wage scale, the
employer stated that he would make other appropriate changes to bring
the office employees' agreement into line with the salesclerks' agree-
ment. On December 9, an early morning meeting was called at which
time the employees present voted to accept the employer's offer. The
union president signed the employer's letter and immediately after the
meeting contacted the stores to inform them that the contract had been
accepted. Within the hour, a decertification petition was filed. Follow-
ing Appalachian Shale, the Regional Director found that the petition
was not barred by the agreement since there existed neither a formal
document executed by both parties nor an exchange of a signed written
proposal and acceptance.
The Board, however, disagreed. The Board held that the em-
ployer's proposal, which included a wage scale and incorporated by
reference to the salesclerks' contract other terms and conditions of em-
ployment, contained "substantial terms and conditions of employ-
ment."'10 2 By signing this proposal, the union formed a contract that
would serve to bar the petition.
The Board's contract bar rules in this area are thus open to varying
interpretation. For the sake of certainty, it would seem preferable to
101. 225 N.L.R.B. 869 (1976).
102. Id at 869.
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adhere closely to the rule that the contract, either in a formal document
or set out in a proposal, must be in writing and that this written state-
ment of the agreement must contain substantial terms and conditions
of employment. If such a rule were consistently applied, unions would
be on notice that the contract should be reduced to writing as soon as
its terms are known. To be lenient in this regard places the Board in a
position of allowing certain agreements to operate as a bar when im-
portant contractual terms can only be filled in on the basis of oral un-
derstandings; yet oral contracts do not serve as a bar. In addition, the
tenor of such a policy does not comport with the Board's general rule in
contract bar cases that extrinsic evidence should not be introduced in
order to clarify the meaning of ambiguous contract terms.
In certain circumstances, the terms of the contract must be ex-
amined to determine whether the contract serves as a bar. For in-
stance, to serve as a bar, a contract does not have to be ratified by the
membership except when the contract itself specifies that it will take
effect only upon ratification. 0 3 Thus, if a union's bylaws require ratifi-
cation and a decertification petition is filed before the membership rati-
fies the union's acceptance of the contract, the contract will serve as a
bar. Similarly, a requirement that an international union approve the
contract will not prevent the contract from serving as a bar if a decer-
tification petition is filed prior to the international's expressing its ap-
proval unless the contract by its own terms makes the international
union's approval a condition precedent to the contract's validity. 0 4 In
most instances, union members will be aware of ratification or interna-
tional approval requirements. Hence, they will normally presume that
the contract is not valid until such requirements are met. The Board's
view, however, results in these reasonably based expectations being up-
set with very little justification. Surely, it would not be difficult for the
Board to examine a copy of the local union's or international union's
bylaws to determine whether a ratification or approval requirement ex-
ists.
Changed Circumstances
In certain situations, a contract may cease to serve as a bar to a
decertification election because of changed circumstances between the
date of signing the contract and the date of petition. In 1958, in General
103. 121 N.L.R.B. at 1162. The ratification requirement must be in writing. Id.
104. See, e.g., Lane Constr. Corp,, 222 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1976); Western Roto Engravers, Inc.,
168 N.L.R.B. 986 (1967); Standard Oil Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 598 (1957).
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Extrusion Co. , o5 the Board laid down a series of rules relating to situa-
tions in which the contract bar rule might not operate because of
changed circumstances.
In General Extrusion, the Board modified prior cases by adopting
the rule that a contract would not serve as a bar if the contract had
been executed:
(1) before any employees had been hired or (2) prior to a substantial
increase in personnel. When the question of a substantial increase in
personnel is in issue, a contract will bar an election only if at least 30
percent of the complement employed at the time of the hearing had
been employed at the time the contract was executed, and 50 percent
of the job classifications in existence at the time of the hearing were
in existence at the time the contract was executed.106
In General Extrusion, the Board also modified its view on mergers and
relocations. It decided that there would be no bar if changes had oc-
curred in the nature of the operation involving a merger of two or more
operations into an entirely new operation with major personnel
changes or if there was a resumption of operations after an indefinite
period of closure with new employees. Mere relocation of a plant with
substantially the same employees, management and type of work
would not prevent the contract from serving as a bar.10 7 Although
there have been some minor modifications to the General Extrusion
principles,10 8 their flexibility, yet reasonably predictable certainty, has
not created a need for any substantial revision.
Schism and Defunctness
A contract can stabilize the bargaining relationship only if the sig-
natory union is able and willing to enforce it. Situations have arisen in
which the union is either so fragmented or so weak that it is unable to
perform its duties as bargaining agent. As a result, the Board has been
required to assess whether a contract should serve as a bar when the
union's status as bargaining agent is in doubt.
The Board has taken the view that, when a union becomes de-
funct, its contract does not bar a decertification election. In Hershey
Chocolate Corp. ,109 a schism case, the Board stated that a bargaining
105. 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958).
106. Id at 1167 (emphasis in original).
107. Id at 1167-68.
108. In 1970, the Board reconsidered the impact of General Extrusion in successor employer
cases. See Wm. J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970), mod#fted, 441 F.2d
911 (2d Cir. 1971); Kota Div. of Dura Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 360 (1970); Travelodge Corp., 182
N.L.R.B. 370 (1970); Hackney Iron & Steel Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 357 (1970).
109. 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958).
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agent is defunct "if it is unable or unwilling to represent the employ-
ees." 1 0 The Board further stressed that "mere temporary inability to
function does not constitute defunctness; nor is the loss of all members
in the unit the equivalent of defunctness if the representative otherwise
continues in existence and is willing and able to represent the employ-
ees."" ' I Under the Hershey Chocolate doctrine, the status of the signa-
tory union is examined only if the issue of defunctness is raised. It is
irrelevant that a nonsignatory parent body indicates its willingness to
administer the local union's contract." 2
The Board has given the defunctness exception to the contract bar
doctrine a narrow application. In Road Materials, Inc. ,"13 where the
union had not processed any grievances or visited the plant for several
years and where the employer had implemented unilateral pay in-
creases, the Board still refused to hold that the union was defunct.' 14
In overruling the Regional Director's determination in this case, the
Board regarded the union's willingness to represent the employees as
the crucial issue. Since the employees had not approached the union
for grievance handling or the holding of meetings, the Board found no
evidence of any unwillingness on the part of the union to represent the
employees." ' 5 It seems that for defunctness to be found to exist, the
union either must have disappeared by virtue of losing all its members
or it must have abandoned its status as bargaining agent, since a union
that is able to sign a collective agreement periodically will probably be
held to have demonstrated its willingness to represent the employees. "16
The defunctness doctrine, then, can have the unintended effect of lock-
ing unit employees into a situation where the union, for some reason,
does not actively represent its members during the life of the contract.
Although this arrangement may satisfy the union and the employer, the
Board should adopt a position that does not unjustifiably penalize em-
ployees.
The Board has recognized that there are times when a schism
110. Id at 911.
111. Id
112. Id at 911-12.
113. 193 N.L.R.B. 990 (1971).
114. Id at 991.
115. Id
116. See, e.g., Sahara-Tahoe Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1109 (1977), aff'd, 581 F.2d 767 (9th
Cir. 1978); Sierra Dev. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 22, 24 (1977), aff'd, 604 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1979), where
the union had maintained an extremely low profile, filing virtually no grievances over a 10-year
period in a unit of over 10,000 employees and rarely, if ever, visiting the casinos to enforce the
contract. A series of three-year contracts were signed despite this inactivity. The union may have
been quiescent but the Board dismissed the suggestion that it was defunct.
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within a union so disrupts bargaining relationships that an exception
should be made to the contract bar doctrine. In the 1950s, when revela-
tions of corruption and communist infiltration within certain unions led
to a rash of schism cases, the Board reconsidered the application of the
contract bar doctrine to schism situations in the leading case of Hershey
Chocolate. 117 That case concerned a split within the Bakery and Con-
fectionery Workers International Union" 18 caused by the members' re-
action to its expulsion from the AFL-CIO for uncorrected corrupt
practices. The AFL-CIO subsequently chartered a rival union, the
American Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union,"19
with the same jurisdiction as the BCWIU. When BCWIU locals at-
tempted to disaffiliate and affiliate with the new ABCWIU, the
BCWIU informed employers that they should not recognize the
ABCWIU locals for the purposes of collective bargaining. Faced with
claims by two unions for recognition, the employer filed for an election.
The question presented was whether the existing contract between the
employer and the BCWIU local barred the election. Observing that it
had generally found a schism to exist when a local union's disaffiliation
occurred "in the context of a basic intraunion conflict," the Board held
that such "a basic intraunion conflict is a necessary prerequisite to a
finding that a schism exists warranting an election."' 20 The Board then
defined "basic intraunion conflict" to be "any conflict over policy at the
highest level of an international union . . . which results in a disrup-
tion of existing intraunion relationships."' 2' Since the split within the
BCWIU was at all levels and was disrupting intraunion relationships,
the contract bar doctrine was held not to apply. 122
The Board does not lightly classify dissident movements within a
union as a "schism." For instance, in B & B Beer Distributing Co. ,123 a
Teamsters local sought to affiliate with another international union
when the International Brotherhood of Teamsters was expelled from
the AFL-CIO for corruption. When the rival union, which tradition-
ally had overlapping jurisdiction with the Teamsters in beer distribut-
ing, petitioned for an election, the petition was dismissed. On appeal,
the Board agreed with the Regional Director that the narrow exception
carved out of the contract bar doctrine in Hershey Chocolate should not
117. 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958).
118. Hereinafter referred to as the BCWIU.
119. Hereinafter referred to as the ABCWIU.
120. 121 N.L.R.B. at 906-07.
121. Id at 907.
122. Id at 908-09.
123. 124 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1959).
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be applied on these facts. The Board distinguished Hershey Chocolate
by pointing out that there was no open split within the Teamsters
union; that the AFL-CIO had not assigned the Teamsters' existing ju-
risdiction to any other union so that two unions, with some claim of
right, could assert bargaining rights; and that no group was intensively
campaigning to win the allegiance of Teamsters locals. Finding that
the facts did not amount to a basic intraunion policy conflict and that
there was no evidence that the Teamsters' expulsion threatened the sta-
bility of its bargaining relationships, the Board held that the existing
contract was a bar to an election.124
A local union that wants to disaffiliate from its parent union and
affiliate with another international union without waiting until the cur-
rent collective bargaining agreement expires may find its path blocked,
as Allied Chemical Corp. 125 demonstrates. There, a weak international
union, District 50, was a prime candidate for merger with one of two
large international unions. Two District 50 national officers were ac-
tively seeking to have the national executive board support their re-
spectively favored unions. A District 50 local preferred a third
international union and voted to affiliate with it. This international
union, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, 126 then filed to have
certification of the bargaining representative amended to reflect the lo-
cal's change in affiliation. On the basis of the contract bar doctrine, the
Regional Director dismissed the case. District 50 subsequently placed
the local in trusteeship. On appeal to the Board, the OCAW argued
that, under Hershey Chocolate, a schism existed; therefore, the contract
was no bar to an election. Reviewing the principles enunciated in Her-
shey Chocolate, the Board emphasized that a schism exists only where
a basic intraunion policy conflict disrupts existing intraunion relation-
ships. 127 The Board pointed out that the local's disaffiliation was not
related to any policy conflict, observing that there was no split within
District 50 as there had been in Hershey Chocolate. Critical to the
Board's determination was its characterization of the dissension within
the union: the rivals were trying to gain control of District 50; they
were not fragmenting it.128 The Allied Chemical case exemplifies the
limited nature of the schism exception as set out in Hershey Chocolate.
As the Board stated in Hershey Chocolate, an election should not be
124. Id at 1422-23.
125. 196 N.L.R.B. 483 (1972).
126. Hereinafter referred to as the OCAW.
127. 196 N.L.R.B. at 484.
128. Id
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directed in a unit with a current contract unless the existing contract no
longer serves to promote industrial stability.129 A contract may fail to
further industrial stability where there is such confusion that bargain-
ing relationships are unstable. This would seem to be the case only
where the employer is confronted with two groups, each of which can,
with some show of legitimacy, claim to be the certified bargaining
agent or its heir.130 Accordingly, routine disaffiliation by a local dissat-
isfied with its parent body would rarely, if ever, qualify as a "true schis-
matic situation" under the Board's view. 31
If the identity of the contracting local can still be pinpointed at the
time a decertification petition is filed, the Board will find an election
barred by the existing contract. It can be argued, however, that the
Board's narrow schism exception unjustifiably restrains employee free-
dom of choice in situations where it is unlikely that industrial stability
will be disrupted. In Allied Chemical, for instance, where both the
membership and the leadership of the contracting local supported the
transfer of affiliation from District 50 to the OCAW, there was no indi-
cation that the change of affiliation would have any impact on the ex-
isting collective bargaining relationship between the local and the
employer. Since the relationship between the employer and the union
was stable, the underlying rationale for the contract bar doctrine was
absent. Nevertheless, the doctrine was applied, thereby compelling the
employees to accept affiliation with an international union not of their
choosing. 132
Unlawful Contract Provisions
Since 1935, the Board has taken the view that contracts contraven-
ing the basic policies of the National Labor Relations Act do not bar an
election. After the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted, application of this
principle was extended to union security clauses. Thus, if a clause was
not executed in conformity with the requirements of section 8(a)(3),' 33
the contract was not a bar. The mere existence of such a clause was
sufficient to eliminate the bar, even if the clause had not been put into
129. 121 N.L.R.B. at 906.
130. 196 N.L.R.B. at 484.
131. See, e.g., Kimco Auto Prods., Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 993, 995 (1970). See also Hershey Choc-
olate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, 909, 911 (1958).
132. District 50 subsequently merged with the United Steelworkers of America.
133. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Section 8(a)(3) was amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley
Act so that employers and unions could execute a union shop agreement requiring union member-
ship as a condition of continued employment on or after 30 days following the employee's em-
ployment. See G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 222-24 (9th ed.
198 1) for a description of the most common union security arrangements.
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effect. 134
In 1958, during its thorough reconsideration of the contract bar
doctrine, the Board decided Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply
Co., 135 which represented a codification of prior cases on unlawful con-
tract clauses. Under Keystone, any contract containing a union security
clause that did not, on its face, conform with the requirements of the
Act or that had been found unlawful in an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding would not bar an election. Any union security clause with am-
biguous language would not constitute a bar. To assist the parties in
drafting a clause that would meet the Board's standards, a "model
clause" was set out. Supporting its stance, the Board argued forcibly
that it could not be regarded as burdensome to observe the law in ex-
press terms. Three years later, in NLRB v. News Syndicate Co. ,136 the
Supreme Court faulted the Board's approach, holding that a collective
bargaining agreement could not be deemed unlawful merely because it
did not affirmatively disclaim all illegal objectives. 137 The Board ac-
cordingly modified its policy in this respect in Paragon Products
Corp. 138
In Paragon Products, the Board stated that only those contracts
containing a "clearly unlawful" union security clause or a clause that
had been declared unlawful in an unfair labor practice proceeding
would not bar an election. 139 A clearly unlawful clause was defined as
"one which by its express terms clearly and unequivocally goes beyond
the limited form of union-security permitted by Section 8(a)3 and is
therefore incapable of a lawful interpretation."'' 40 Hence, ambiguous
clauses, unless determined to be unlawful in an unfair labor practice
proceeding, would not bar an election since extrinsic evidence of actual
practice would not be considered in a representation proceeding.' 4'
The Board's self-imposed rule against considering extrinsic evi-
dence can have a harsh impact. In Jet-Pak Corp. ,142 the union security
provision was lawful on its face, but the contract that was executed on
September 16, 1976, was made effective retroactive to July 1, 1976. As
a result, some new employees might have been denied their thirty-day
grace period in which to join the union. The Regional Director consid-
134. Eagle Lock Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 970 (1950).
135. 121 N.L.R.B. 880 (1958).
136. 365 U.S. 695 (1961).
137. id at 699-700.
138. 134 N.L.R.B. 662 (1961).
139. Id at 666.
140. Id
141. Id at 667.
142. 231 N.L.R.B. 552 (1977).
UNION DECERTIFICATION
ered extrinsic evidence, which took the form of stipulations by both
parties to certain facts, since he believed that such uncontroverted evi-
dence did not present "dangers normally present in a non-adversary
representation hearing."' 43 Having considered this evidence, the Re-
gional Director found that an election was barred. The Board, how-
ever, adhered strictly to its rule and stated, "[W]e are permitted only to
examine the terms of the contract as they appear within the four cor-
ners of the instrument itself.' 44
The application of the Board's rule against extrinsic evidence in
cases such as Jet-Pak Corp. seems unduly inflexible since "boilerplate"
contract clauses are often drafted in advance of contract expiration to
take effect at 12:01 A.M. on the day following the date of expiration of
the old contract. In so doing, the drafters anticipate that, even if a new
contract is not actually settled by that date, it will often be made retro-
active to it. That the union security clause as stated could then be con-
strued to be unlawful is a fact that may well escape many local union
officials. 45
The Board's rigid adherence to this rule also produces cases in
which minor technicalities have a major impact. In one case, for exam-
ple, the contract was concluded on May 20, 1968, but the formal docu-
ment was not signed until June 10, 1968.146 The formal contract
document stated that the contract had been made and entered into on
May 20 and was effective from May 20. When a decertification petition
was filed, the Regional Director found it was not barred by the contract
because the union security clause was unlawful in possibly denying
some employees the full thirty-day grace period. In so finding, the Re-
gional Director stated that the different effective and signing dates
transformed the contract into one that was retroactively effective. The
Board disagreed, stating that, by its very terms, the contract took effect
on the very day it was entered into. 147 As a result, the union security
clause was unlawful, and the contract was a bar to an election. There is
no reason to believe, however, that the nonunion employees in this case
received any more notice of the contents of a contract that had not yet
been reduced to writing than the employees in Jet-Pak. The Board's
position is that the rights of these employees could be vindicated in an
143. Id at 553.
144. Id The Board's final consideration was whether the clause in the contract was lawful on
its face. The Board found the clause lawful since it gave employees a statutory 30-day grace
period to become union members. Accordingly, it found that an election was barred. Id.
145. See, e.g., Standard Molding Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 1515 (1962), and cases cited therein.
146. National Seal Div. of Federal-Mogul Corp., 176 N.L.R.B. 619 (1969).
147. Id at 619.
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unfair labor practice proceeding, a position that is equally applicable to
the employees in Jet-Pak.
The scope of the unlawful contract exception to the contract bar
doctrine extends beyond union security clauses. Contracts that on their
faces contained provisions clearly unlawful with regard to such issues
as dues checkoff, seniority, 48 preferential hiring 149 and racial discrimi-
nation 50 have been held not to bar an election. Somewhat inconsis-
tently, an unlawful hot cargo clause did not influence the employees'
choice of a bargaining representative. '51 Such reasoning would seem to
be equally valid on the question of a seniority clause. If a union
breaches its duty under a contract that is lawful on its face, that con-
tract will serve to bar a decertification election. 52
PRESUMPTION OF MAJORITY
If an employer suspects that a union no longer has the support of a
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit, he may wish to cease
recognizing the union for the purposes of collective bargaining.
Whether he can do this without violating his section 8(a)(5) duty to
bargain in good faith depends on whether he has a good faith doubt of
the union's continued majority status and whether, at that particular
time, the presumption of continued majority status is rebuttable. Since
an employer will often doubt the union's majority status once he learns
that there is a campaign to decertify the union, the issue of presumption
of majority frequently arises in a decertification context.
Irrebuttable Presumption of Majority
There are certain protected periods of bargaining when the pre-
sumption of the union's continuing majority cannot be challenged, for
instance, during the certification year and for a reasonable period fol-
lowing voluntary recognition, the issuance of a bargaining order and
the settlement of 8(a)(5) charges. At those times, decertification peti-
tions will be dismissed as untimely even if the signatures on the petition
indicate that a clear majority of the employees in the unit wants to oust
148. Pine Transp., Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 256 (1972).
149. Peabody Coal Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1231 (1972).
150. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
151. Food Haulers, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 394 (1962).
152. See, e.g., Loree Footwear Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 360, 360 (1972), where it was asserted that
the contract was no bar to an election because the union had breached its duty of fair representa-
tion. Because the contract was lawful on its face and because of the Board's policy of not permit-
ting extrinsic evidence to be introduced at the hearing on a decertification petition, the Board held
that the contract did serve as a bar to an election.
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the union. 153
During Certification Year
In Brooks v. NLRB, 54 the Supreme Court held that, absent unu-
sual circumstances, 5 5 an employer has a duty to bargain with the
union certified as the bargaining agent for his employees for one year
from the date of certification. 56 In Brooks, where the union lost a ma-
jority of its members shortly after the election through no fault of the
employer, the Supreme Court affirmed the longstanding Board position
that the union should still have one year in which to carry out its man-
date.' 57 While noting that this rule promoted "a sense of responsibility
in the electorate and needed coherence in administration,"' 158 the Court
was not unaware of other, more pragmatic considerations underscoring
such a policy. The Court stated:
It is scarcely conducive to bargaining in good faith for an employer
to know that, if he dillydallies or subtly undermines, union strength
may erode and thereby relieve him of his statutory duties at any
time, while if he works conscientiously toward agreement, the rank
and file may, at the last moment, repudiate their agent.' 5 9
Consonant with the Court's reasoning in Brooks is the Board's
rule, promulgated in Mar-Jac Poultry Co. ,160 that the certification year
will be extended if the employer's unfair labor practices have frustrated
the union's ability to carry out its duties as bargaining agent during the
original certification year. In Mar-Jac, the company shut down six
months after bargaining had commenced. Two years later, the same
stockholders resumed business under a different name. The union re-
quested that the company resume bargaining. When the company re-
fused, stating that the union no longer had majority support,' 6' the
union filed a charge under section 8(a)(5). When an employee decer-
tification petition was filed, it was dismissed by the Board on the
grounds that the union had not received the benefit of bargaining for a
153. See NLRB v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 497 F.2d 43, 52 (5th Cir. 1974).
154. 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
155. The Court cited defunctness and schism as examples of unusual circumstances. Id. at 98.
156. Id at 104.
157. The Board had taken the position as early as 1939 that a union should have a reasonable
period in which to carry out its mandate. See Whittier Mills Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 457, 463 (1939),
enforced, Ill F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1940) (seven months). For the formalization of the one-year rule,
see Thompson Prods., Inc., 47 N.L.R.B. 619, 621 (1943).
158. 348 U.S. at 99.
159. Id at 100.
160. 136 N.L.R.B. 785 (1962).
161. The company's statement was probably factually accurate since the composition of the
workforce had changed substantially.
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substantial part of the certification year, a period, as the Board noted,
"when Unions are generally at their greatest strength."' 162
In remedying the unfair labor practices in Mar-Jac, the Board or-
dered the employer to bargain for a full year, thus taking no account of
the six months during which bargaining had occurred in the original
certification year. In Brooks, the employer had been ordered to con-
tinue recognizing the union for the remainder of the certification year.
Although the Board did not do so, Mar-Jac can be distinguished from
Brooks on the grounds that the employer in Mar-Jac had displayed an
intransigent attitude toward the union, which, in large part, contributed
to its loss of majority, whereas in Brooks, the employees repudiated the
union on their own.
Whether employees who no longer support the union and who
perhaps have never supported the union should be locked into an ex-
tended period of union representation without the opportunity of ex-
pressing their choice raises difficult questions, both legal and practical
in nature. Practically, the efficacy of such a remedy is questionable. In
such situations, the employees' confidence in the union's ability to win
concessions may have been severely undermined, if not destroyed, by
the employer's tactics.163 At most, the union will have one year in
which to regain the allegiance of the employees. Aware that the only
way the union is likely to accomplish this is by concluding a collective
agreement that represents a substantial improvement in terms and con-
ditions of employment, the employer will doubtless be in no haste to
sign such an agreement. At the end of the year, the employees may
very well decertify the union. If the end result is the same, 164 the justi-
fication for applying the Mar-Jac rule, which postpones the employees'
section 7 rights, must lie elsewhere.
The Fifth Circuit responded to this point in a case where it en-
forced a Board order that extended the certification year. The court
asserted:
It would be particularly anomalous, and disruptive of industrial
peace, to allow the employer's wrongful refusal to bargain in good
162. 136 N.L.R.B. at 787.
163. Particularly destructive of the union's support may be the substantial length of time
which can elapse between the filing of the unfair labor practice charge and the handing down of a
decision by a federal court of appeals enforcing the Board's order. See, e.g., Bishop v. NLRB, 502
F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1974), where five years had passed without the unfair labor practice charge
being resolved.
164. There is no empirical data on the efficacy of Board orders extending the certification year.
Labor relations practitioners on both sides pinpoint as the most common factor motivating decer-
tification the members' perception that the union is ineffective at the bargaining table. Cook,
supra note 15, at 38.
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faith to dissipate the union's strength, and then to require a new elec-
tion which "would not be likely to demonstrate the employees' true,
undistorted desires,". . . since employee disaffection with the union
in such cases is in all likelihood prompted by the employer-induced
failure to achieve desired results at the bargaining table. 1
65
The Fifth Circuit's observation was made in a case where the employer
displayed a particularly belligerent and obstructionist attitude toward
bargaining with the union and had committed numerous unfair labor
practices.1 66 This fact is of utmost importance since the Board's reme-
dial power "is merely incidental to the primary purpose of Congress to
stop and to prevent unfair labor practices." 167 If there has been no
unfair labor practice, a Board order requiring bargaining for an ex-
tended certification year would seem to be a punitive, rather than reme-
dial, measure. 168
The limitations on the Board's remedial powers were raised by the
Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Gebhardt- Vogel Tanning Co. 169 In that
case, the union was certified on July 9, 1963. During the certification
year, the employer delayed in disclosing wage information to the union
during bargaining. The union filed a charge under section 8(a)(5) in
October alleging that the employer had delayed five months in handing
over the information. In November, the employer furnished the wage
information, and the union withdrew the unfair labor practice charge.
On July 28, 1964, a decertification petition was filed. The Regional
Director, dismissing the petition on the basis of the rule in Mar-Jac,
stated that the union did not have the benefit of the full certification
year since the employer had unlawfully delayed in disclosing the wage
information. The Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order
extending the certification year since, on the facts presented, there was
no finding that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice. '
7 0
Although the Seventh Circuit was technically correct, its decision had
the effect of penalizing a union which had declined to use the proce-
dures of the NLRB to engage in unnecessary litigation. Such a deci-
165. NLRB v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 497 F.2d 43, 51-52 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
166. Id at 45. For example, the employer had threatened to shut down the plant, had dis-
missed a union activist, had told employees they would get nothing more and had taunted em-
ployees to go on strike. Id
167. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 643 (1958).
168. Although the punitive/remedial terminology is less than clear conceptually, a punitive
order is one where there is a "patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be
said to effectuate the policies of the Act." Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540
(1943).
169. 389 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1968).
170. Id at 75. There had never been a hearing on the unfair labor practice charge and no
evidence relating to it was offered at the hearing on the decertification petition.
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sion can only lead other unions to refuse to withdraw charges for fear
that it may redound to their disadvantage.
Although the Aar-Jac rule remains a vital remedy in the Board's
enforcement scheme for 8(a)(5) violations, 71 the Board will, in its dis-
cretion, refuse to extend the certification year in circumstances where
the rule arguably applies. In one case, 172 the union was certified to
represent a unit of dental laboratory technicians in March 1973.
Shortly thereafter, the employer contracted out the lab work, and all
the technicians were dismissed. The union immediately filed unfair la-
bor practice charges. Several months later, the employer reopened the
lab, and by mid- 1974 the number of employees in the unit had attained
its earlier level. In 1974, the Board found that the closing of the lab
was economically motivated but that the employer had violated section
8(a)(5) by not bargaining about the impact of the closing. 173 In Janu-
ary 1976, the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's order and the issue of
back pay was referred to the NLRB's regional office. At this point, the
parties voluntarily agreed to negotiate a contract covering the lab tech-
nicians, none of whom had been employed in March 1973. Bargaining
ceased after six sessions when the parties learned that a decertification
petition had been filed. The union appealed the Regional Director's
direction of an election,' 74 claiming that since it had bargained for a
total of only three months under its certification, the certification year
should be extended and the decertification election barred. Consider-
ing the applicability of the Aar-Jac rule, the Board held that the exten-
sion of the certification year was not warranted in these "rather unusual
circumstances."' 175 In reaching this conclusion, the Board found per-
suasive the fact that the closing of the lab was economically motivated
and that the hiatus in bargaining was not attributable to an employer
unfair labor practice.
Following Voluntary Recognition
For a reasonable period of time following an employer's voluntary
recognition of a union, the employer cannot lawfully refuse to bargain
with that union even when it is clear that the union has lost its majority;
the union's presumption of majority is irrebuttable. The genesis of
171. See Downey, The Mar-Jac Rule Governing the Cer~f#cation Year, 29 LAB. L.J. 608 (1978).
172. Jack L. Williams, D.D.S., 231 N.L.R.B. 845 (1977).
173. Jack L. Williams, D.D.S. (Empire Dental Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 860 (1974).
174. The Regional Director considered whether the principles of Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc.,
157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966) were applicable. See text accompanying notes 182-83 infra.
175. 231 N.L.R.B. at 847.
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this rule can be traced to the 1944 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Franks Brothers Co. v. NLRB. 176 In Franks, an employer re-
fused to bargain with the union on the basis of its having authorization
cards from a majority of the employees. When the union filed for an
election, the employer engaged in a course of antiunion conduct, and
the union filed unfair labor practice charges, which blocked the holding
of the election. 177 More than a year later, it was held that the employer
had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. Rather than direct
an election, the Board ordered the employer to bargain with the union
even though the turnover in the work force indicated that the union
had lost its majority status. 178 The Supreme Court enforced the
Board's order, stating that, if the bargaining order remedy were un-
available and elections had to be held when shifts in the work force
during the pendency of unfair labor practice charges had occurred,
then recalcitrant employers might be tempted to commit unfair labor
practices in order to postpone indefinitely their bargaining obliga-
tion. 179 In responding to the employer's arguments, the Court pointed
out that the bargaining order was not designed to establish a perma-
nent bargaining relationship but that "a bargaining relationship once
rightfully established must be permitted to exist and function for a rea-
sonable period in which it can be given a fair chance to succeed."' 80
The Board regards this statement as support for its rule that an em-
ployer can be ordered to continue bargaining with a union that has lost
its majority support even when the employer in no way caused the loss
of support.l8 '
The Board took this position in Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc. ,182
where the employer had voluntarily recognized the union and com-
menced bargaining. Within three weeks of recognition, raiding by a
rival union had caused the bargaining agent to lose its majority. Citing
the statement quoted above from Franks Brothers, the Board held that
the employer was required to continue recognizing the union for a rea-
sonable period of time. In Keller, the Board found it unnecessary to
decide what constituted "a reasonable period of time" since clearly it is
176. 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
177. See text accompanying notes 227-55 infra.
178. The union had gained a card majority in June 1941. The Board's decision was handed
down in October 1942. The high turnover stemmed mainly from the mobilization following
America's entry into World War II. Franks Bros. Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 898 (1942).
179. 321 U.S. at 705.
180. Id
181. See Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586 (1966).
182. 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966).
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more than three weeks.' 83
The Keller doctrine becomes operative as soon as an employer rec-
ognizes a union. In one case, 184 a majority of the employees signed a
petition to oust the union only three days after the employer had volun-
tarily recognized it on the basis of a card check. The decertification
petition was dismissed on the grounds that it was untimely since the
union had not yet had a reasonable period of time in which to carry out
its mandate as bargaining agent. 85 Similarly, the employer's refusal to
engage in bargaining once the decertification petition was filed was
held unlawful since the presumption of the union's majority at that
point was irrebuttable. 186 In responding to the employer's argument
that it was unfair to bind the employees for a lengthy period on the
basis of such an informal and uncertain method of selection, the Sev-
enth Circuit noted that there was no reason to distinguish between the
two modes of bargaining agent selection authorized by section 9 of the
Act in deciding that the bargaining relationship, once rightfully estab-
lished, should have an opportunity to function. 87 The court observed
that the employer or employees should have challenged the lawfulness
of the voluntary recognition if they doubted its validity. 88
If the union at the time of the employer's voluntary recognition
did not have a majority, the bargaining relationship will not be given a
reasonable period in which to function since it was not rightfully estab-
lished. The Board has held that it is irrelevant under Keller Plastics
that the employer's recognition was "purely voluntary"; recognition
must be based on a demonstrated showing of majority. 89
The Board has long held that an employer who agrees to bargain
with a union, in return for the union's withdrawing an unfair labor
practice charge, is obligated to honor that agreement "for a reasonable
time after its execution without questioning the representative status of
183. Id at 587.
184. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 399 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1968).
185. The court did note that, unlike the situation in Franks, there were no employer unfair
labor practices in Montgomery Ward which contributed to the union's loss of majority. The court,
however, found persuasive the Supreme Court's reasoning in Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954),
supporting an enforced year of bargaining. 399 F.2d at 411-12.
186. Id at 412-13.
187. Id at 412.
188. Id It can be seriously argued that it is unrealistic to expect employees, on their own, to
challenge the employer's voluntary recognition of a union.
189. In Jack L. Williams, D.D.S., 231 N.L.R.B. 845 (1977), after the dental laboratory re-
opened, the employer voluntarily recognized the union for the purpose of representing the unit
employees, most of whom were new, without any showing of majority. The Board upheld the
Regional Director's refusal to apply Keller Plastics. Id. at 846.
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the Union."'190 The Fourth Circuit, affirming the Board's order in
Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. NLRB,' 91 stated. "If a settlement
agreement is to have real force, it would seem that a reasonable time
must be afforded in which a status fixed by the agreement is to oper-
ate."' 92 Hence, an employer who has agreed to bargain with the union
as part of a settlement agreement cannot refuse to do so on the grounds
that a majority of its employees have signed a decertification peti-
tion. 193 In such circumstances, the petition will be dismissed as un-
timely.
Subsequent to a Bargaining Order
Following similar reasoning, the Board has held that once bar-
gaining commences in compliance with an NLRB bargaining order, the
bargaining relationship must have a reasonable period of time in which
to function regardless of the union's actual majority status. In NLRB v.
Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals,194 the employer asserted that the em-
ployee decertification petition meant that the employees no longer
wanted the union as their bargaining agent. In upholding the Board's
dismissal of the decertification petition as untimely, the Fifth Circuit
suggested that it was an equally plausible assumption that the unfair
labor practices continued to affect employee sentiment, making a fair
election impossible. 195
Rebuttable Presumption of Majority
Once a union has established its majority status on the basis of
either a certification election or a lawful voluntary recognition by the
employer, there is a presumption that the union continues to enjoy ma-
jority status. 96 This presumption is irrebuttable at certain times, as
discussed above. 197 At other times, the presumption of majority is re-
buttable.
To rebut the presumption of majority status, an employer must
show that the union, in fact, no longer enjoys majority status or that it
190. Poole Foundry & Machine Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 34, 36 (1951).
191. 192 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
192. Id. at 743.
193. See, e.g., Foster & Foster, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 955 (1979).
194. 473 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1973).
195. Id at 385.
196. Terrell Machine Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929
(1970).
197. See text accompanying notes 153-93 supra.
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has a good faith doubt about the union's continuing majority status. 198
To constitute a "good faith doubt," the employer's doubt must be based
on objective considerations, and it must be raised in a context free of
unfair labor practices. 199
If the collective bargaining agreement is due to expire shortly and
the employer suspects that the union no longer commands majority
support in the unit, the employer may contemplate refusing to bargain
with the union on a new contract. Such a course of action, however,
presents a dilemma. If an employee decertification petition is timely
filed subsequent to the employer's refusal to bargain, 2°° it will most
likely be dismissed under the Board's blocking charge rule, assuming
that the union has filed an 8(a)(5) charge in response to the employer's
refusal to bargain.20' If the employer does refuse to bargain and it is
later determined that his suspicions did not amount to a "good faith
doubt;" he will be found to have violated section 8(a)(5). A bargaining
order will be issued, and he will not be permitted to question the
union's majority status for a reasonable period of time. As a result, in
deciding whether or not to bargain with the union, it is of utmost im-
portance to the employer that he be able to estimate with reasonable
certainty whether his suspicions constitute a "good faith doubt" in the
Board's view.
Good Faith Doubt of Majority Status
It can be said with reasonable certainty that the employer's doubt
must arise in an atmosphere free of unfair labor practices if there is to
be any likelihood that it will be classified "good faith. ' 20 2 A finding
that the employer's conduct violated section 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(5) will un-
dermine his claim of good faith. Even if the employer's conduct does
not amount to an unfair labor practice, if it is claimed that the conduct
198. Sierra Dev. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1977); Terrell Machine Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480,
1481 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
199. Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1179, 1180 (1968); Celanese Corp.
of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 673 (1951).
200. See notes 81-92 supraand accompanying text. Since a union seeking to modify the con-
tract is statutorily required to give the employer 60 days advance notice of this fact, a union often
sends a letter to the employer in the period 90-60 days before contract expiration. This same
period of time is the open period for the filing of decertification petitions. As such, an employer
who is aware that a decertification campaign is afoot may receive the union's letter before he is
certain that a decertification petition will be filed or before the NLRB's regional office notifies him
that a petition has been filed. See Telautograph Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972).
201. For a discussion of the circumstances where the filing of a charge under § 8(a)(5) will not
block a decertification election, see notes 222-26 infra and accompanying text. For a more typical
case, see Stresskin Prods. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1972).
202. Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 673 (1951).
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was "aimed at causing disaffection from the union,''2°3 the Board may
well conclude that the atmosphere has become tainted so that any
doubt of the employer cannot be classified as a good faith one.
Much more difficult to predict are the factors on which an em-
ployer may reasonably rely in concluding that the union has lost its
majority. While certitude is not required, the Board has tended to look
with disfavor on anything less than a very high degree of probability.
The Board has admitted that there is no simple formula for determin-
ing when a good faith doubt exists.2°4 As such, the Boad examines the
totality of the circumstances in which the doubt arises.
The Board takes the view that the employer's doubt must be based
on "objective considerations" of the union's loss of majority.20 5 Relia-
ble information that more than 50% of the unit employees support
decertification usually suffices to raise a good faith doubt. The em-
ployer must, however, possess more or less precise information; state-
ments that "many" employees do not want to be in the union are too
vague.2°6 An estimate that more than 50% of the employees probably
no longer support the union, based on a common sense appraisal of the
situation, will usually be insufficient to raise a good faith doubt. For
instance, in Massey-Ferguson, Inc. ,207 the employer based its doubt on
the fact that the union had won a narrow victory shortly before, that
there had been high turnover in the unit, and that supervisors had re-
ported that many employees were dissatisfied with the union. The
Board held that the employer did not possess a good faith doubt.20 8
Stating that the narrow election victory was insignificant, the Board
observed that high turnover was a factor to consider but in itself was
not sufficient to establish good faith doubt since new employees are
presumed to support the union in the same ratio as those they have
replaced.2°9
203. Id at 673.
204. Id
205. Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1179, 1180 (1968). The Board's
determinations in this area are accorded great deference. See NLRB v. Gulfmont Hotel Co., 362
F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966).
206. Sierra Dev. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 22, 24 (1977). But see Stresskin Prods. Co., 197 N.L.R.B.
1175 (1972).
207. 184 N.L.R.B. 640 (1970).
208. In Massey-Ferguson, the employer had unilaterally implemented a wage increase after
reaching impasse which was better than its last offer to the union, thereby violating § 8(a)(5).
Thus, the employer's doubt did not arise in a context free of unfair labor practices. The Board did
not consider separately the issue of whether the doubt was based on objective considerations. Id
at 641.
209. Id. This presumption was applied in a case where there was 100% turnover in the unit
and the size of the unit had doubled. King Radio Corp., 208 N.L.R.B. 578, 581-83 (1974), en-
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The weight that can be placed on supervisors' reports of employee
sentiments is unclear. In Massey-Ferguson, the Board stated that the
evidence of employee dissatisfaction must come from the employees
themselves, not from supervisors on their behalf.210 Some weight, how-
ever, seems to be given to supervisors' observations when they are but-
tressed by employee comments. For instance, in Stresskin Products
Co. ,21 a good faith doubt was based primarily on "numerous and sub-
stantially identical reports from presumably trustworthy supervisors
and employees. ' 212 Comments evincing dissatisfaction with the union
made by employees directly to supervisors are persuasive evidence of
the union's loss of support, but supervisory personnel must be ex-
tremely careful in their contacts with employees regarding the union.
Since supervisors cannot interrogate employees about their feelings
about the union without violating section 8(a)(1), the employer must
depend on employees' volunteering their opinions to supervisory per-
sonnel. Likewise, attempts by supervisors to steer the conversation to-
ward the subject of the union's popularity, unless done neutrally, might
be construed as attempts to cause disaffection with the union.
The Board carefully scrutinizes the objective considerations put
forward by the employer to determine whether they indicate that the
employees no longer want the union to be their bargaining agent. As a
result, the fact that less than 50% of the employees in the unit belong to
the union, in itself, is not determinative since it can be argued that there
are employees who want the benefits of union representation without
the obligations of union membership. 21 3 Similarly, the fact that some
employees abandoned a strike and crossed the union's picket line can-
not necessarily be interpreted as a sign that they no longer wish the
union to represent them since their return to work might have been
wholly for personal reasons unrelated to the union's stance. 214
In some cases, the employer lists several reasons why he doubted
the union's majority status. Taken individually, each factor may be
insufficient to support a finding of good faith doubt, but if taken to-
gether, the reasons may well provide the basis for such a finding. Al-
though the Board has not been altogether consistent in its approach, it
forced, 510 F.2d 1154(10th Cir. 1975). See also Strange & Lindsey Beverages, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B.
1200, 1201 (1975).
210. 184 N.L.R.B. at 641.
211. 197 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1972).
212. Id. at 1180. About 400 employees were in the unit. Nowhere was it contended that a
majority of those employees spoke individually with a supervisor.
213. See, e.g., Sierra Dev. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 22, 24 (1977).
214. Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 674 (1951).
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has displayed a marked tendency toward a weighing of each factor on
its own.
Six cases in which the employer questioned the majority status of
the hotel and bartenders union in the same city illustrate this ten-
dency.215 In all six cases, the employer belonged to the Reno Employ-
ers' Council, which had a collective bargaining relationship with the
union dating from 1959. Realizing in early 1974 that the union's mem-
bership was so low as to jeopardize the negotiation of a new contract
later in the year, 216 local union officers sought to enlist the aid of the
international union. In June 1974, the international sent out organizers
in a campaign to increase the local's membership. In mid-summer, lo-
cal newspapers ran articles on this union activity and quoted an inter-
national trustee as stating that only about 20% of eligible employees in
the area were members of the union.217 In this same period, the em-
ployers noted union activity within the casino-hotels, and supervisors
received complaints from employees who did not want to join the
union. In late summer, each employer timely withdrew from the mul-
tiemployer association and subsequently refused to bargain with the
union, asserting doubt about the union's majority status. Except for
this refusal to bargain, there was no allegation that any employer had
engaged in unfair labor practices.
In its defense to the 8(a)(5) charge, one employer made the follow-
ing arguments: (1) the union had never demonstrated a majority since
it had been voluntarily recognized; (2) the size of the unit had tripled
since the union was recognized; (3) turnover in the unit since the last
contract was 500%; (4) the statements of the international trustee indi-
cated that the membership of the local union was very low, and the
union was engaged in an organizing drive; (5) many employees had
indicated to their supervisors that they were dissatisfied with the union
and were not interested in joining it; (6) the union had filed only one
grievance in a twelve-year period during which there had been 10,000
employees at the hotel; and (7) there was no union security or dues
215. Sierra Dev. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 22 (1977), a'd, 604 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1979); Sahara-
Tahoe Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1977), afrd, 581 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1978); Carda Motels, Inc.,
228 N.L.R.B. 926 (1977); Barney's Club, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 414 (1976), modeed, 623 F.2d 571 (9th
Cir. 1980); Nevada Lodge, 227 N.L.R.B. 368 (1976), aft'd, 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir., 1978); Tahoe
Nugget, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 357 (1976), aft'd, 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978).
216. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 357, 360 (1976), aft'd, 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978).
The local union had approximately 900-1000 members out of a possible 10,000 at that time. Sa-
hara-Tahoe Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1109 (1977), af'd, 581 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1978).
217. The local union had been placed in trusteeship by the international union. The trustee
stated that the local's membership had increased from 900 to 1800 since the campaign began and
estimated a 20% unionized rate. 229 N.L.R.B. at 1109.
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checkoff provision in the contract.21 8 The Board considered each argu-
ment on its own and found only two arguments relevant to the issue of
majority status: the employees' complaints and high turnover. Since
only 29 out of 202 employees had complained to their supervisors and
since new employees are presumed to support the union in the same
ratio as the employees they replace, the Board found that the employer
could not have possessed a good faith doubt about the union's majority
status in the particular unit. Coming to the same conclusion in all six
cases, the Board demonstrated that what an employer believes to be
true after a careful review of the situation may fall short of what the
Board demands as the basis for a good faith doubt.
Effect of a Deceriflcation Petition
In many cases, the employer's doubts of the union's majority status
are heightened when a decertification petition is filed. The question,
therefore, often arises whether an employer can refuse to bargain with
the union because a decertification petition has been filed with the
NLRB.
The mere filing of a decertification petition, which requires only
that 30% of the employees desire an election, does not raise a real ques-
tion of representation. 21 9 Therefore, if an employer ceases to recognize
the union as the representative of his employees subsequent to the filing
of a decertification petition, he will violate section 8(a)(5) of the Act,
unless it is determined that he possessed a "good faith doubt" of the
union's majority status at the time he ceased recognizing the union.220
It should be noted that if an absolute majority of the unit employees
sign the decertification petition, the real question of representation is
usually raised, and the employer may refuse to bargain with the
union.221
In Telautograph Corp. ,222 the Board considered the predicament of
an employer who sought to postpone bargaining on a new contract un-
til after the decertification election was held. In Telautograph, the em-
ployer and the union had agreed to meet on September 14, 1970, to
218. Sierra Dev. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 22, 23-24 (1977), aft'd, 604 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1979).
219. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. 640 (1970).
220. See, e.g., Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1968), where the
employer refused to bargain after a decertification petition was filed but before the Regional Di-
rector determined that a question of representation existed. The employer was able to establish
that it possessed a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status. Id. at 1180.
221. This assumes that no employer unfair labor practices have contributed to the undermin-
ing of the union's status. If this is the case, such a decertification petition clearly indicates that the
union has lost its majority status and an employer relying on such a petition would be basing his
refusal to bargain on objective considerations.
222. 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972).
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commence bargaining on a new contract. On September 3, an em-
ployee decertification petition was filed. On October 23, the Regional
Director found that the petition was timely filed. The bargaining ses-
sion did not take place as scheduled. Shortly after the hearing on the
petition, the union contacted the employer regarding meeting to begin
bargaining. Awaiting the Regional Director's decision, the employer
did not respond. After the Regional Director found that the petition
was timely filed and directed an election, the employer replied that it
would not enter into bargaining on a new contract at that time because
the question of representation remained to be settled. The union then
filed an 8(a)(5) charge, at which point the Regional Director applied
the Board's blocking charge rule and indefinitely postponed the hold-
ing of the decertification election pending the outcome of the unfair
labor practice charge.
The employer in Telautograph did not possess a "good faith
doubt" about the union's majority status under the criteria discussed
above. 223 Ordinarily, it would have been found to have violated sec-
tion 8(a)(5), but the Administrative Law Judge refused to recommend
the finding of a violation in the "special circumstances" of that case,
224
namely that the employer refused to bargain only after the Regional
Director had determined that a question of representation existed. The
Administrative Law Judge emphasized that a "critical factor" in his
recommendation was that the employer's refusal to bargain had oc-
curred in a context totally devoid of any antiunion animus.225 In
adopting the Adminstrative Law Judge's findings and recommenda-
tions, the Board stresssed that the decertification petition must raise a
"real question of representation" in order for it to justify an employer's
refusal to bargain on a new contract.226 The Board further clarified its
stance by stating that the union could continue to administer the con-
tract and could still process grievances.
Telautograph provides guidance for an employer confronted with
a union demand that bargaining on a new contract take place even
though a decertification petition has been filed. The employer should
not refuse to bargain until the Regional Director finds that a question
of representation exists and directs an election. Providing that the em-
223. The employer and the union had a longstanding collective bargaining relationship cover-
ing a unit of 11 employees. The employer did not assert that it had possessed any doubts prior to
the filing of the petition. Id at 893.
224. Id.
225. Id at 894.
226. Id at 892.
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ployer has engaged in no antiunion conduct, his refusal to bargain on a
new contract while continuing to recognize the union should not block
the prompt holding of the decertification election, assuming that the
Regional Director does not mechanically apply the blocking charge
rule.
THE BLOCKING CHARGE RULE
In an exercise of its discretion under the Act, the Board has long
taken the position that it will generally not conduct an election in a unit
during the pendency of unwaived unfair labor practice charges relating
to that unit.227 Since the unfair labor practice charge "blocks" the
holding of the election, this policy has been labelled the "blocking
charge" rule.
The blocking charge rule is based on the premise that it would
contravene the purposes of the Act to proceed with an election argua-
bly tainted by an employer's unfair labor practices. 228 As one court
succinctly noted, "it would surely controvert the spirit of the Act to
allow the employer to profit by his own wrongdoing. ' 229 The evident
rational underpinning to this rule has led numerous courts to cite it
with approval.230 The Board's application of the rule, however, has not
always met with the uncritical approval of the courts.
In a series of cases arising in the Fifth Circuit, the courts have had
occasion to scrutinize the Board's procedures for delaying the holding
of a decertification election upon the filing of unfair labor practice
charges. In each case, the threshold question was whether the federal
district court had jurisdiction, since the challenged ruling was an in-
terim order in a representation case. Generally, decisions of the NLRB
in representation cases are not reviewable by the district courts,23' and
under section 10(f), 232 only final orders of the Board are subject to re-
227. The blocking charge rule was first applied in United States Coal & Coke Co., 3 N.L.R.B.
398 (1937).
228. See text accompanying note 165 supra. See also Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock
Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1980).
229. Bishop v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024, 1029 (5th Cir. 1974).
230. See id and cases cited therein.
231. R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 59-65 (1976).
232. Section 10(f) provides in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in
part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of
appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have
been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such a court a written
petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside.
29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1976).
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view by the circuit courts. The United States Supreme Court decision
in Leedom v. Kyne 233 was seen as providing the basis for jurisdiction in
the blocking charge cases. In Leedom t. Kyne, the Court held that the
federal district courts are empowered to grant injunctive relief in repre-
sentation cases where the Board has acted contrary to a specific provi-
sion in the Act and where the employees' rights under the statute will
otherwise be denied because there is no statutory mechanism by which
they can enforce their rights.
In Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co. ,234 employees brought
suit complaining that their decertification petition filed in 1968 had
been held in abeyance for three years because of an unfair labor prac-
tice charge filed in 1964.235 Stating that the only issue in the case was
the arbitrary use of the blocking charge procedure, the Fifth Circuit
commented, "The short of the matter is that the Board has refused to
take any notice of the petition." 236 The court limited the applicability
of its holding by stating that it was not considering how the blocking
charge rule should be applied against employers or when it would be
within the Board's discretion to refuse to process a decertification peti-
tion.237 The thrust of the Templeton court's decision is that by delay-
ing, the Board had failed to act in accordance with a specific provision
of the Act 238 and, as a result, employees were being denied their statu-
tory right to determine whether they wanted to be represented for the
purposes of collective bargaining. The court, therefore, ordered the
Board to consider the decertification petition without delay.2 39 Al-
though the court in Templeton did not order that the decertification
election be held, it made quite clear in dicta that the underlying ration-
ale for the blocking charge rule was inapposite in that case and that the
election should be held promptly.24°
233. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
234. 444 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1971).
235. The union filed charges in 1964. In early 1966, the Board found that the employer had
violated §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5), and ordered reinstatement of the unfair labor practice strikers.
Dixie Color Printing Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 143 (1966). In 1966, the Board's order was enforced.
Dixie Color Printing Corp. v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Bargaining ceased in Octo-
ber 1967 when impasse was reached. 444 F.2d at 1066. In January 1968, an employee decertifica-
tion petition was filed. Id Later in the year, both the Board and the union went back to the
District of Columbia Circuit seeking a contempt citation. This was still pending in 1971. Id
236. Id. at 1069.
237. Id. at 1070.
238. Section 9(c)(1) provides in pertinent part:
[Wlhenever a petition shall have been filed, .... the Board shall investigate such peti-
tion.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
239. 444 F.2d at 1070.
240. For instance, the court observed that it was "unlikely that there are past unfair labor
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The ramifications of Templeton were explored the following year
in Surratt v. NLRB, 241 a case also arising in the Northern District of
Alabama. In Surratt, an employee decertification petition was filed in
December 1970, fourteen months after the union had been certified.
After the petition was filed, the union filed charges under section
8(a)(5), alleging that the employer had not been bargaining in good
faith since June 1970. Approximately six weeks later, the Regional Di-
rector dismissed the decertification petition on the basis of the blocking
charge rule. After the Board affirmed the dismissal, employees filed
suit in federal district court. When the case came before the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the Board has not yet rendered its decision on the 8(a)(5) com-
plaint, but it was known that the Administrative Law Judge had
recommended that the charges be dismissed. The court in Surratt
stated:
The Board should not be allowed to apply its "blocking charge prac-
tice" as aper se rule without exercising its discretion to make a care-
ful determination in each individual case whether the violation
alleged is such that consideration of the election petition ought to be
delayed or dismissed. 242
The court clarified its position when responding to the Board's argu-
ment that Surratt should be distinguished from Templeton on the
grounds that the delay in Templeton was much longer. The court noted
that this was a difference of degree, not principle, and that the Board
should make a careful determination before deciding to delay the
decertification election.243
The limited utility that Templeton has for employees seeking to
compel the Board to conduct a decertification election became appar-
ent in Bishop v. NLRB.244 In Bishop, the union filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges against the employer, Winn-Dixie Stores, 245 in late 1969.
The case was still slowly making its way up to the Board when an em-
ployee decertification petition was filed in April 1972. The Regional
Director determined that the unfair labor practice charges had merit
and then applied the blocking charge rule and dismissed the petition.
practices which have a present impact upon the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives
by the employees." Id The court's observations are problematical since in the seven years since
the original unfair labor practice charge, no contract had ever been concluded and 17 strikers had
not yet been reinstated. In addition, the contempt citation was still pending.
241. 463 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1972).
242. Id at 381.
243. Id
244. 502 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1974).
245. The Fifth Circuit noted that the employer was "no stranger to this Court in unfair labor
practice proceedings." Id at 1025 n.1 (listing five such cases involving the employer).
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The employees then filed suit in federal district court seeking an order
compelling the National Labor Relations Board to process their peti-
tion. 246 The Fifth Circuit responded by noting that the district court
should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter since the "carefully circumscribed jurisdiction" carved out in
Leedom v. Kyne, Templeton and Surratt did not reach the instant
case.247 The court noted that jurisdiction would exist only where the
Board had failed to act in accordance with a specific provision of the
Act. Here, the Board had acted in accordance with section 9(c)(1). It
had investigated the petition when it was filed, and it had made a deter-
mination to dismiss the petition after careful consideration of the mer-
its of the individual case. The court emphasized that the Board had not
followed a mechanistic approach as it had in Templeton and Surratt in
applying the blocking charge rule as if it were a per se rule.248
Subscribing to the view that the employees' desire to rid them-
selves of the union might well be the result of the employer's unfair
labor practices, the court in Bishop commented that if the employees
still wanted to oust the union after it had had an opportunity to operate
free from the employer's unlawful conduct, they then could file another
decertification petition.249 As Hamil v. Youngblood 250 illustrates, how-
ever, the employees may be stymied the second time around.
In Haml, the Board found in 1972 that the employer had violated
section 8(a)(5). The following year, the Tenth Circuit enforced the
Board's order and bargaining commenced. In late autumn of 1973, the
union charged that the employer was still bargaining in bad faith 251
and asked that the Tenth Circuit hold the employer in contempt. A
decertification petition filed in 1975 was dismissed. In February 1976,
the union and the employer signed a collective agreement.252 On Sep-
tember 8, 1976, a Special Master for the Tenth Circuit recommended
that the employer be held in contempt of the court's 1973 order. Two
weeks later, the employees filed their second decertification petition. It
246. Id at 1026 n.2. The court commented that the matter seemed moot since the Board had
"processed" the petition by virtue of affirming the Regional Director's determination that no real
question of representation existed. The Fifth Circuit rendered a decision in the case in order not
to add its "mite to this intolerable delay." Id at 1027 n.2.
247. Id at 1027.
248. Id at 1031.
249. Id at 1029.
250. 96 L.R.R.M. 3016 (N.D. Okla. 1977).
251. The charge alleged that the employer refused the union access to the plant in 1973, and
that there were some unilateral job classifications and merit increases during this period. Id at
3021.
252. The contract was made retroactive to November 1975. Id at 3022.
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was dismissed two days later by the Regional Director on the basis of
the blocking charge rule. In his letter, the Regional Director cited the
contempt charge still pending in the Tenth Circuit, a charge that re-
lated to conduct during negotiations for a contract that was by then
approaching expiration.
Asserting that it is the responsibility of the court to determine
whether the Board has rationally exercised its discretion in applying
the blocking charge rule, the district court in Hamil found that it could
not make such a determination because the Regional Director had not
made an investigation or subjective determination on the merits of the
individual case and that he had not articulated his reasons for dis-
missing the petition. Accordingly, the court held that, before the Re-
gional Director applies the blocking charge rule, an investigation
should be made to determine whether the alleged unlawful conduct of
the emnployer was of such a nature as to make a free election un-
likely.253 Further, the Regional Director should set out the factors on
which he based his decision, thereby providing the basis for proper ju-
dicial review.
The court in Hamil would not go so far as to detail the nature of
the required investigation. The court did note that such an investiga-
tion would be tailored to the requirements of each case, which would
reflect whether the Board was already familiar with events relating to
the unit.
The Hamil court's formulation strikes a balance between permit-
ting unfettered Board discretion and hampering the Board unnecessa-
rily in the application of the blocking charge rule. As the court
indicated, the Board will, in some cases, possess sufficient knowledge of
the unfair labor practices affecting the unit employees, and these facts,
if not stale, will obviate the need to undertake a time-consuming and
costly formal investigation.
The court in Hamil was sensitive to the rationale behind the block-
ing charge rule: that the employer's alleged unlawful conduct could
prevent a reasoned choice by the employees. Unless it is determined
that the employer's conduct is likely to restrain the employees in exer-
cising their free choice, there is no reason to dismiss a decertification
petition, thereby thwarting the employees' statutory rights. 254 The
Hamil decision also eliminates one unintended side effect of the block-
ing charge rule: that unions, anticipating a mechanistic application of
253. Id at 3021-23.
254. Id at 302 1.
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the rule, might be encouraged to file unfair labor practice charges to
forestall a decertification election. 255
CONCLUSION
With management attorneys and labor relations consultants ex-
plaining the mechanics of the decertification process at seminars for
company executives, 256 it is not surprising that the unions' success rate
in decertification elections has been declining. What is more difficult to
pinpoint are the reasons why the number of petitions filed has in-
creased so sharply in the past five years and how much of this increase
can be attributed to the activities of labor relations consultants. One
spokesman for the labor movement has charged that companies en-
courage "spontaneous" decertification drives as part of a "deliberate,
calculated campaign" to destroy unions.257 Regardless of the accuracy
of this allegation, it is clear that an increasing number of employers
have become more sophisticated in the ways in which they communi-
cate to their employees their viewpoint that the employees do not need
the union.25 8
The decertification scenario envisioned by opponents of the Taft-
Hartley Act does occur, but only infrequently. In briefly discussing
"the power of an employer to break a labor union if he chooses to do
so," Senator Pepper in 1947 argued that an employer who had taken a
very hard bargaining stance and thereby provoked a strike could per-
manently replace economic strikers and then petition for a decertifica-
tion election in which the striking employees would not be entitled to
vote.259 Now that striking employees retain their right to vote in an
NLRB election for one year,260 an employer must be in a position to
255. Id at 3022. See also NLRB v. Minute Maid Corp., 283 F.2d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 1960).
256. Krupman & Rasin, Decertification: Removing the Shroud, 30 LAB. L.J. 231, 231 n.1
(1979). See also Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, 51, 315 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Oversight Hearings]. See, e.g., statement of Robert A Georgine, President, AFL-CIO Building
& Construction Trades Dep't before the Subcommittee. Id. at 410-19.-
257. Remarks of Thomas Donahue, Executive Assistant to AFL-CIO President George
Meany, before the convention of the Louisiana AFL-CIO, Mar. 20, 1979. DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), MAR. 20, 1979, AT El-2.
258. See, e.g., Raskin, Big Labor Strives to Break Out of Its Rut, FORTUNE, Aug. 27, 1979, at
32-40. See also Oversight Hearings, supra note 256, at 246, for a report of a labor consultant's
specific recommendations on how companies can achieve and maintain nonunion status.
259. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY II, supra note 22, at 1606. At that time, the only statutory limita-
tion on the immediate holding of the decertification election would have been if an election had
been held in the same unit within the preceding year.
260. In 1959, § 9(c)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act was amended so that economic strikers who are
not eligible for reinstatement are nevertheless entitled to vote in an NLRB election for 12 months
following the commencement of the strike.
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operate during a very long strike in order to achieve decertification in
this fashion.26' Hence, few decertifications are of this type, although
the ones that are tend to excite very strong emotions.262
Labor relations practitioners commonly believe that, in the major-
ity of cases, the employees' main reason for filing a decertification peti-
tion is their perception that the union has been ineffective at the
bargaining table. 263 The employees' disenchantment with the union is
especially likely to occur during the life of the first contract when their
expectations of improvements in wages and conditions are not met.
It may be that employers are now more attuned to the possibility
of decertification when confronting a vulnerable union as contract ex-
piration draws near.264 As one court noted, "there comes a point when
hard bargaining ends and obstructionist intransigence begins. ' 265 Ad-
mittedly, this dividing line is not always easy to detect,266 but if an
employer takes a vigorous hard bargaining stance yet is able to remain
within the arena of lawful good faith bargaining, there is the distinct
possibility that it may undermine the employees' confidence in the
union's ability sufficiently so that the employees are moved to decertify
the union. One example of this occurred in Firestone Synthetic Rubber
& Latex Co. 267
In Firestone, the union was certified in 1965. Not until August
1966 was a contract concluded, and this contract was for one year only
with provision for a wage reopener after three months. In November
1966, the union reopened negotiations on wages. Unable to reach
agreement on this issue, the union struck in mid-January 1967. On
April 28, 1967, the employer wrote to each employee to communicate
its last offer. Within a week, the union indicated that it would accept
261. Typically, the employer is able to hire persons who are willing and able to permanently
replace the strikers. Now that an increasing number of plants can be operated, if not at full
capacity at least near full capacity, by non-exempt, non-unit personnel, the employer may be
given time at the beginning of a strike to consider hiring replacements.
262. See, e.g., Coors Undercuts Its Last Big Union, BUSINESS WEEK, July 24, 1978, at 47-48.
See also Cook, supra note 15, at 38.
263. Id
264. Whether an employer wishes to capitalize on this vulnerability is a strategic question. An
employer who is aware of the union's weakness may not welcome decertification if another, more
aggressive union is actively organizing in the area. It cannot be denied, however, that some labor
consultants view bargaining to impasse as a "prelude to union ouster." See Oversight Hearings,
supra note 256, at 32 (statement of Alan Kistler, Director of the AFL-CIO's Dep't of Organization
and Field Services). See also Unions. Turning Them Out, THE SOUTH MAGAZINE, Nov. 19, 1979,
at 40, for the advice of a management labor lawyer.
265. NLRB v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 497 F.2d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1974).
266. See, e.g., Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
11 (1977).
267. 173 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1968).
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this offer but conditioned its acceptance on certain terms relating to the
resumption of work, terms that the company found unacceptable. 268
May went by with no settlement. On June 2, 1967, an employee decer-
tification petition was timely filed. On June 7, the union gave notice, as
required by statute, of its desire to begin bargaining on a new contract
because the current one was due to expire on August 5. At this point,
the company refused to bargain, claiming that it had a good faith doubt
about the union's majority status.269 On July 27, 1967, the employer
unilaterally implemented its last wage offer270 and cancelled the strik-
ing employees' medical and life insurance. 27' The union then filed un-
fair labor practice charges. The Board held that at no point did the
employer violate the Act; hence, the strike at all times was an economic
strike.272 In addition, the employer was found to have a good faith
doubt of the union's majority status; therefore, its refusal to bargain on
a new contract was lawful.273
In Firestone, it is not surprising that the employees were dis-
enchanted with the union. In the eighteen months following certifica-
tion, they had worked under a union contract for less than six months,
had been out on strike over four months and had seen their union
achieve little more than could have been expected with no union on the
scene.
Similarly destructive of the union's support is an inability to con-
clude a first contract, particularly where the employer's conduct is
deemed to be lawful. 274 Even when unlawful employer conduct occurs,
the impact on the employees may be just as likely to inspire decertifica-
tion. When hard bargaining slips over the line into bad faith bargain-
ing, the remedy for the section 8(a)(5) violation will normally be an
order to cease and desist from such conduct and to undertake bargain-
268. The union demanded that there be no reprisals and no layoffs. The company responded
that it would not take back anyone who had engaged in violence. Management also noted that as
a result of a nationwide strike against Firestone Tire Company, demand for their product was
reduced; therefore, not everyone on strike would be recalled immediately. Id
269. The company calculated that 202 employees in a unit of 365 no longer supported the
union. (Of 120 employees who had spoken with supervisory personnel, only 30 had signed the
decertification petition containing 112 signatures.) In addition, 70 strikers had returned to work.
Id at 1179-80.
270. The company took the position that on May 6th, impasse had been reached on the wage
issue. The Board agreed. Id at 1180.
271. This was done after notice to the employees. The employer had informed the strikers of
such a possibility as early as February. Id at 1179.
272. Id at 1180.
273. Id
274. See, e.g., Stresskin Prods. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1972), where the union was certified
on September 29, 1969. When the employee decertification petition was filed in October 1970, the
parties were still bargaining on the first contract. Id at 1175-76.
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ing in good faith. As noted above, a decertification election will not be
held for a reasonable period following the commencement of good
faith bargaining, but it has never been suggested that this period should
exceed one year; and yet, as one court has noted, "some practices may
be of such pernicious nature that their effect upon employees is clearly
apparent and longlasting. ' ' 275 Thus, if this second round of bargaining
should be drawn out, the employees may become demoralized. From
their perspective, they have waited during one fruitless period of (bad
faith) bargaining; then nothing happened for a substantial period of
time (while the case worked its way up through the Board and the
courts); and now, renewed bargaining still has not yielded a contract.
The reaction of employees in one such case, as expressed in their decer-
tification petition, was predictable: "It is our feeling that [the union]
has accomplished nothing in our favor, therefor [sic] we would like a
new election. 276
Unlike Western European unions, which draw on a well of class-
based ideological support, American unions have always appealed to
workers on the basis of the material results that unions can achieve.
Yet, as the Firestone case indicates, American employers are increas-
ingly willing to take a firm stance277 to demonstrate to their employees
their conviction that unionization does not necessarily bring better
terms and conditions of employment. In some instances, no doubt, the
employer's hard bargaining stance is largely the product of the em-
ployer's refusal to accept collective bargaining and the concomitant re-
solve to thwart the bargaining process.278 In such cases, whether the
employer actualy bargains in good faith and whether the employer will
be found to have bargained in good faith by the Board are issues that
have little impact on the dynamics of industrial relations. When the
unit employees come to the conclusion that the union's achievements
fall short of the anticipated standard, decertification becomes a distinct
possibility.
275. Hamil v. Youngblood, 96 L.R.R.M. 3016, 3023 (N.D. Okla. 1977). The court in Hamil
was referring to the validity of applying the blocking charge rule when the conduct complained of
had occurred three years earlier. The unfair labor practice case had not yet been closed.
276. NLRB v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 497 F.2d 43, 52 (5th Cir. 1974). In this case, the em-
ployer challenged the NLRB's bargaining order and extension of the certification year as a means
of remedying the § 8(a)(5) violation. See text accompanying note 164 supra.
277. Unions charge that some employers deliberately offer unacceptable terms during bar-
gaining as part of a strategy to force the union to go out on strike. Having already planned to
operate during the strike, the employer suffers minimally from the strike while inflicting serious
damage on the union. See AFL-CIO NATIONAL ORGANIZING COORDINATING COMMITTEE, 21
REPORT ON UNION BUSTERS 3 (Oct. 1980).
278. See, e.g., Taking Aim at "Union-Busters," BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 12, 1979, at 98, 102 for a
report on tactics advocated by some labor consultants.
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